Monday, July 28, 2008

Averroes and the Promulgation of Reason

I've been mulling over Averroes' Decisive Treatise. Some may have heard of the infamous "Two Truths" theory of the Latin Averroists, in which they claimed that there is one truth for faith, and one truth for reason, and that these sometimes conflict. Now, even that much has been handed down to us largely through those prosecuting the Averroists (as far as I understand), and so is probably not the most accurate view of the Latin movement even. In addition, most of Averroes' works to be translated into Latin were his commentaries, which leave out his most well-developed position (which is in the Decisive Treatise). So, here is a summary of Averroes' position, which seems to be highly relevant to many of the issues with which I've been struggling concerned the role of the laity to theology and intellectual endeavors.

Averroes considers people to fall into three classes, which pretty much correspond to philosophers, theologians, and everyone else, according to their level of understanding. Most people don't think too deeply about things, and so what they need is rhetoric and laws to help them get through life in good Islamic fashion. Some people have more discernment, however, and these people can pick up on dialectical arguments; that is, arguments concerning consequences, but not necessarily well-grounded. Finally, some people can look into the ultimate causes of things, and these people are suited for demonstration; that is, arguing from first principles.

Now, the thing is that for Averroes, all of these should reach the same truth. Demonstration, Dialectic, and Rhetoric all should be arriving at the same place, and so there should be no disagreement about the basic matters of the faith. However, one should be careful with what information one presents to people. It takes time to think through arguments, and demonstration in particular requires a good deal of study to use effectively. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing, as far as Averroes is concerned, and so people should not be exposed to things beyond their understanding. The common person should not hear about the difficulties of interpretation of Scripture, and in fact are bound to believe the literal sense of passages even in the case of a symbolic meaning (as the literal sense has some connection to the inner meaning, and the person will be closer to the truth be following this than by going out of their depth). Similarly, theologians are fine with their material, but shouldn't play around with philosophy, while philosophers shouldn't confound the theologians with their arguments.

Of course, this has been a simplified presentation; I haven't read the book for a couple months, and I'll need to get back to it at some point. While I'm skeptical about the possibility of true demonstration, or a simple tripartite division, I think that the overall structure is recognizable in today's church. This division of knowledge would hardly be popular in our society, but I can't deny that at least at some level (apart from various details and the practicality of working it out), it appeals to me, at least if any standard of orthodoxy is to hold. Anyone with thoughts to share?

Sunday, July 20, 2008

Second-Order Religious Pluralism

Sparked on by a short conversation with a friend the other day, I've been thinking about forms of religious pluralism, and what could possibly ground them. Now, the problems with a straight-forward approach (such as by Hick) are well-known; if nothing else, Hick et al. are really creating an alternative religion. So, is there any way of discussing religious pluralism which gets around this? Also, what is entailed by religious pluralism?

I've mentioned in other posts about attempts to explain Buddhism from within Christianity. Also, I think that Christianity could be explained by Buddhists from within a Buddhist framework. So, could it be that each religion could explain others from within its own framework? If this is so, than the pluralism which results would not end up as yet another religion, and there would be reason to continue dialogue. Statements such as "All religions are at root one" would be meaningful to all participants and commonalities could be established on this point, even though the reason why they are one would differ according to different views.

This seems to be analogous to morality amongst different cultures. There at least appears to be some (strong) family resemblance between moral codes, even though the reasons why one should be moral differ sometimes drastically (following the will of God, to attain enlightenment, developing virtue, heeding the categorical imperative, doing what creates the society with the most happy, fulfilled people, etc.). Despite the different causes of morality (and sometimes different prescriptions), all of these different views have enough in common to talk about the subject.

Given this, there still remain different types of religious pluralism; the two that seem to me to be the most important are referential and soteriological pluralism. I see no reason why relatively conservative members of religious traditions must deny referential pluralism (though accidentally to their orthodoxy there may be reasons); that is, that the different Realities spoken of within traditions all refer to the same Real (which, unlike Hick, is always refined within a tradition to that tradition's own Real). So, Christians can say that Muslims are referring to the same God as themselves, though inaccurately. Further, Buddhists even in their own views are really in some way (confusedly) referring to God, even if they deny such (as nirvana, or buddha-nature, or suchness, or perhaps something less well-defined). On the flip side, Buddhists can say that Christians, Muslims, et al. all are approaching the the Buddhist view of the Real, although perhaps with extra layers of symbolism and myth (which may need to be removed to truly attain enlightenment).

Soteriological pluralism is the more hotly contested topic. This would entail that the salvific efficacy of different religions are all at root one (and so, by implication, that many people in other religions can also be saved through their own practices). So, Christians can say that God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is actively working in the world (in all three persons). However, as actively working, there should be some actual workings, and so these can be referenced by Christians and non-Christians alike (otherwise, there seems little reason to assign more that psychological benefit to Christianity). From this, it could be (without assessing further information) that other religions have noticed the divine workings, and working follow alongside, though they do not have the proper names and categories to rationally process this. Similarly, Buddhists could see the point of Christianity to be anatta by subjecting one's will to the will of some God; even though this is merely mythical, it could supply what is necessary for Buddhist "salvation."