Reason in Nature

I've started working with the Urban Ecology Center. It's actually nice to be out in the sun pulling weeds for a change, especially after sitting indoors in a chair all day. And, geek that I am, I am thoroughly excited to start learning about prairie plants and migratory birds (insert obligatory Monty Python joke here).

I was collecting seeds the other day, and one of the volunteers was explaining to a student about domestication and why domesticated rye has larger seeds than wild rye. I though about that, and how odd human cultivation is as a process of evolution. Normally, plants develop thorns and poisons and stuff to avoid being eaten. Here, though, under human care, they no longer resist us - they grow alongside us precisely to be eaten. We're on the same side instead of constantly opposed, as it were.

Now, I want to take this so far only as a metaphor - in reality, the rye doesn't care about having larger seeds or being domesticated, so we can't actually say that rye is "better" for the arrangement. I think that dogs and cats really do end up in a symbiotic relationship with human beings - they get regular food and shelter, lacking in the wild, and we get rid of mice and burglars, and we have funny internet memes.

But the point is this: human beings, given the sort of beings we are, can adapt to nature from within nature and rework it into an "everybody wins" sort of approach. Not always, granted, or in any way with even a modicum of grace at times. But think of how odd this is. If there are too many deer, they can't learn to cultivate grass or switch food sources. The grass gets eaten and the deer starve to death. The way to avoid this is an external force: add wolves or hunters to take down the number of deer.

That's where human beings differ. We have reason. We have an internal force for change. I don't mean by reason mere logic - that is merely one form that reason takes. Reason is the ability to take up the form of the world around us, to understand it and in so doing identify with it.

Think about this: What, in the end, am "I"? Something in some way tightly connected to this hunk of matter at particular spatio-temporal coordinates, to be sure. Certain patterns of brainwaves, yes. But I don't have to be just that. People identify with their good friends, parents identify with their children, patriots identify with their country, and so on. We all consider our "selves" to be something beyond ourselves (unless we really are concerned just with fulfilling basic needs, and honestly, that sounds like the most boring life possible to me.)

It is reason which lets us take up aspects of the world around us. If I identify with a certain task of domesticating wolves, for example, I have to know what wolves are like. I have to work with their natures as given - I have to accept the world and wolves as they are. To do otherwise will not result in the end I want nor in a dog that can benefit from my involvement. It may be an excellent way of getting mauled, however.

Of course, we also have people working with each other. When working with rye and wolves, human beings are not quite the same as the domesticated. With other humans, one might be concerned that I am giving a recipe for domination. But I am saying that we need to treat whatever we identify with as the sort of thing it is. Human beings aren't plants and can't be treated as such. If I were in a relationship, I would need to attend to my lover's needs as they in fact are. Failed and sickly relationships are the result of this not working, for any number of reasons. Good relationships are when both parties can in fact do this. Identification cannot be merely good intentions - it must involve trying as hard as possible to understand people and situations as they are in themselves. (Just trying to have good intentions usually results in trying to look good. Trying to have good results from within the world as it actually is and acting accordingly, is in itself a good intention.)

To act irrationally, by contrast, is to act counter to the way the world is, to act based on our own subjective whims and fancies, on what we "feel in our hearts" regardless of whether that stands up under scrutiny. It is, in short, to choose our current selves and our presently-limited preoccupations over what we could be, to choose deception and its short-term smothering comfort over truth. It is to become that deer that will starve to death unless it is ripped apart by wolves first. the deer that cannot even take care of itself because it could not take heed of its environment.

This is why I champion unending, thoughtful and careful analysis of our opinions and get tired of emotionalism, tribalism, and relativism of the sort that descends into mere etiquette and shuts off genuine debate. Reason is sometimes held up as the tool that divides and separates, but that is only its short term function. It must divide the true from the false, the real from the fantastic, and as long as society prefers its own whims, reason must break it. But this is for the goal of a better society, one in which the good is accessible to all in self-sustaining fashion, because people can take up themselves, each other, and the world around them as it is and as they are part of the whole. True, this is an ideal and most likely never reachable. But even though most of us will never reach the north pole, the direction North on the compass or GPS is still necessary for navigation.

Reason, ultimately, is justice.

The Purpose of Inconsistency

Why would one would consider contradictory speech to be philosophically appropriate? Given that contradictions can be meaningful, why would one use them? First, it may be that one believes that all systems are going to be inconsistent at some point anyhow. If this is true, then there is relatively little value in ironing out all of the wrinkles of discourse instead of simply investigating what one can. Also, if I have doubts about any given chain of reasoning or system, I have much less reason to follow it through consistently. It may be far better to pursue many lines of reasoning, even if they are mutually inconsistent, since then I may hit the truth on a couple points at least.

Second, one may be strongly convinced by both the arguments for x and the arguments for not-x. The contradiction does not mean that there isn't some y which is coherent with x but which is semantically and practically similar to not-x. This is the problem with some ad hominem attacks: showing that a given person is inconsistent shows nothing about whether a better version of their views could succeed, entailing that they really were close to being right in the first place. In the meantime, holding on to the contradiction may be the most intellectually responsible choice, while pursuing a research program of eventually resolving the contradiction while keeping the insights.

Third, it may be that certain mystical views can only be couched in contradictory terms. If there is some reality utterly responsible for absolutely anything, then language which can only look at certain things at any given time will encounter difficulties. Contradiction shows language's (and thought's) breaking points, and it is the fact of breaking which points to what is to be communicated.

Fourth, one may be holding to a dialectical tension. This I think is closest to what I am talking about with skepticism. On the one hand, I think that everything is doubtable (and once this is realized, also already doubted, for those familiar with what I've said before on this blog). But I also think that we should continue investigating the truth. Should I throw one side or the other away because I can't unite them at one time? No; I continue in a constant back-and-forth, which seems to accomplish a number of aims (including understanding) better than any single idea or system.

But if nothing else, saying that someone is being contradictory is a paltry criticism. It contributes nothing to discussion; it merely wins points in debate. It is therefore sophistry and not philosophy, unless it is accompanied by substantial interaction. Show how some premise is wrong, show how my understanding is off, show some alternative, but show something of value.

Against Qualms Concerning Inconsistency

Continuing from the last post, I think that I've pinpointed a little bit more clearly what is going on when I reject claims of the self-defeating nature of certain views. Now, when one claims that someone is being inconsistent, they can refer to the language as being inconsistent, the concepts as being inconsistent, or a claim that the world is inconsistent. Further, the assumption seems to be that these three claims are more or less equivalent. But I disagree, and the inconsistencies I raise do not seem to be harmful ones.

Inconsistency in language, if by itself, doesn't seem pernicious. Inconsistent statements have some sort of meaning, as evidenced by the fact that people sometimes find them to be the most useful way of conveying a message. We can argue about their efficacy, but that they are meaningful is clear (they are meaningful to someone, at least; chances are, if you don't get them, it's your problem and not the other person's). And it would seem that concepts would work the same way, when considered independently of language.

The problem comes in when inconsistency in language or concepts would imply such an inconsistency in the world, which is nonsense. But why assume that an inconsistency in language implies that one claims a similar inconsistency in the world? There is an assumption of an isomorphism between world, language, and concepts. All three can be broken up into pieces which interrelate, whatever these pieces may be (perhaps form, matter, and esse, for example, where each of these can stand for a word, a concept, and an external reality). The interrelations in the world mirror those in language and concepts, and language and concepts can be made more or less precise enough to accurately mirror the world.

If there is such an isomorphism, then contradictions in language and concepts do seem to be problematic. But why assume the isomorphism in the first place? This is an assumption, and there seems to be no reason why it shouldn't be examined as well, especially when it is advanced as a weapon in some apologist's arsenal. Why can't we say that the world is a seamless whole, which nevertheless lends itself to being talked about and thought about in some way? Language and concepts are discursive, and reality is not (in this thought experiment), but that doesn't mean that language and concepts are worthless or meaningless. The point of them is a certain sort of interaction with reality, of which ultimately they are a part as well (and even here, I must use "part" language, which isn't accurate, but it may be a useful approximation for those with eyes to see). Contradictions in language then do not entail contradictions in reality. Assuming that contradictions in language do not entail anything whatsoever (and I see no reason to assume without argument that language works like a formal logical system), then why not allow contradictions?

Someone might say at this point, that it is only confused language which breaks the law of contradiction; phrases in such language might mean something, but the whole does not. Logic is the judge of language, whether language follows its laws or not. But why should we assume that? Logic is basically set theory, and works for those relationships capable of being modeled on sets. It is not clear to me that all philosophical relationships must be so clear and set-like; why assume that anything philosophical must therefore be able to be made clear, precise, and analytical?

And the next argument: "but the negation of the law of contradiction entails the law of contradiction; therefore it must be true", is pure sophistry. Not only does it not seem to be "true" anymore once one has negated it, but also, I am saying that language goes beyond precise boundaries. To revert to an argument that "the law of contradiction is either true or false" is already to miss the linguistic and ontological move I am making. In another way, the argument for the law of non-contradiction it is to assume the law of the excluded middle, as well as predicates for which both apply. I deny the law of the excluded middle too, or at least its applicability to any and all meaningful phrases.

Finally: "But with what you are saying, you can say anything and get away with it. This is just a ploy to avoid any criticism." No, it is a recognition that simply pointing out formal flaws has never been good philosophy. Look at the substance; to the reality itself! Logic is the handmaiden of true thinking, and not vice versa. We are engaged in far too difficult a program here to simply sort out arguments and thought based on cosmetic issues.

Is Skepticism Self-Defeating?

I was writing this as a comment on an earlier post, but I keep thinking of more stuff to say, so I think that I'll just make another post of it. The charge is this: skepticism is self-defeating. It asserts something, namely that nothing is to be asserted. I'm not a big fan of these types of "self-defeating" arguments, and I figured that I should lay out my reasoning. Of course, if anyone understands the reasoning, one will realize that all that I am about to say should not be held to, that one should look beyond the reasonings, but a first step must be taken.

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Language is practical. One uses it; it's not setting forward fixed propositional truth. This at least is the standpoint I want to explore here for the moment. It's hardly a critique of a statement to say that it falls apart in saying that language falls apart. Anyone who took the statement to be a set of propositions which I was strictly asserting would have gotten it wrong. Look at the moon, not the finger; or if you prefer, use the ladder then kick it away.

One can look at the meaning of such an argument in two ways. First, one can take the straightforward meaning. One will have missed the point then, since one will think it perfectly consistent, but it is helpful in leading one to a given state. The practical function of leading someone to a non-discursive state is the point, since I can't very well put that state down on paper or computer screen itself.

Alternatively, one can realize the inconsistencies, but then the meaning is in the performance. Treat it as a poem, if you prefer; there seems to be nothing wrong with putting down in performance and poetry what cannot be said in prose.

The criticism (and the related claim that from a contradiction everything follows) only operates on one level of language. But this is a fairly high level, and there is something going on underneath. Language affects us and moves us even before we have it completely rationally synthesized. Take the poem "Jabberwocky", for example. If I have to look at it in terms of referents and such, it is pure nonsense. The terms just have no meaning. But yet, one does have a vague sense of what goes on in the poem, regardless. Likewise, a contradictory statement might be nonsense when analytically interpreted, but that's not the only level on which that statement was functioning.

Why should we say that such statements have meaning? Because some people say they do. If Bob sees only that x is meaningful, but cannot see any meaning in not-x, while Alice claims to grasp the meaning of not-x, it would seem that Alice has the advantage. Bob's lack of imagination or overly-focused view of the world could just as much explain why he cannot get what not-x is getting at as not-x being meaningless. Not being able to conceive something (especially when someone else can conceive of it) doesn't amount to much in argument.

If anyone has been following this post, they will realize that what I am saying is primarily to be used, not judged right or wrong (although one can judge the post efficacious or not, and can judge whether the destination is worth arriving at). Of course it's all nonsense if one looks at it purely analytically; so find other ways of looking at it.

But let's take the worst-case scenario: the above just doesn't work (and I stress its working and not its veracity) and it all is just inconsistent without any directly redeeming value. Well, what is one to do? Pick up just another other system that's lying around to get out of the problem? But this seems to be at least as bad; leaps of faith are such because they are blind leaps, and blind leaps land you in chasms more often than not. If I can't escape from being embedded in some conceptual system, being human and thrown into the world as it is, this doesn't mean that I must therefore give my allegiance to some conceptual system. I can simultaneously recognize that no conceptual system is grounded, perhaps even that no conceptual system is completely coherent, while also recognizing that I must be implicated in one and can never simply jump out and either renounce all views or take a God's eye view. Will this pull me in two directions, and so be "inconsistent"? Sure, but it seems that a continuing movement between imperfect systems is better than giving up and artificially ironing out a problem of human living and dedicating myself to one of them.

Ruminations on Math and Knowledge

As I've been tutoring in math lately, I've been thinking about what goes on within mathematics and possible relations to our own knowledge. Maybe some analogies here will clear up some of my ideas concerning the nature of logic and its relation to reality; on the other hand, maybe it'll just lead to more obfuscation.

(1) When we work with sines and cosines (as well as tangents, cotangents, secants, and cosecants), we are referring back to the relations between the sides of a triangle. We are actually talking about the sides of that triangle, with precise and true statements. However, we can never get at those sides in and of themselves. We really only get at their relations, and so all of our thinking about them is entirely relational. But this doesn't affect its validity. Further, through these trigonometric relations, we see all sorts of things which we would not have seen without looking at the relations; we can see how triangles relate to circles, we can work with all sorts of signals in engineering, we can calculate many different identities relating our relations are so delve into the depths of the nature of mathematics. All of this is possible precisely because we are working with the relations (we are speaking "analogically," if you will). So, even if we cannot know the sides in themselves, we can understand their significance and have real, true, precise, meaningful speech about them.

(2) We've all learned about the quadratic equation. There are cubic and quartic equations too, for higher order polynomials, and so anything with at most an x⁴ term in it can be solved through an equation (even if the equations are too complicated for most practical use). However, there is no general equation for any higher order polynomial; once an x⁵ is in there, kiss straightforward procedures goodbye. We can prove that there cannot be a general procedure for solving these monsters. I'll maybe look at the proof some other time; meanwhile, the importance of this is that even though we have a perfectly logical, ordered reality, we cannot analyze it all according to any one method.

Hurray for Platonism!

Random Philosophical Thoughts

I'm really only blogging about half the things that I would like to; I figure that for everything I jot down, it means another post which I added earlier will be ignored. However, I also want to write stuff out before I forget it, and so here it goes: some variations on a theme of Scotus.

Thought #1: I see that Scotus is often criticized for having such a complicated system of logic. These criticisms are often directed at him by those who wish to get back down to reality. But I would think that the complicated logic is precisely and indication of Scotus' commitment to explaining reality! Those who get too caught up in abstractions have simple, or at least simpler, logical systems; just chop out the stuff you can't explain and be done with it (*cough* Ockham *cough*). Complicated logic is usually a sign that a person is grappling with the nitty-gritties of the situation and not content to let the abstraction do all the work.

Thought #2: We need a category for the analytic a posteriori. We have the analytic a priori (immediate and necessary), synthetic a posteriori (mediate and contingent), and synthetic a priori (mediate and necessary). But it seems that there are immediate and contingent beliefs (and therefore, analytic a posteriori): I exist, I see, I perceive such-and-such. We might be able to transform any of these statements to an analytic a priori statement by teasing out logical entailments, but this would miss the actual grounding of these statements. I don't logically conclude by the meaning of the words "I exist" and their entailments that I exist, I just have an immediate cognition of the contingent fact of my existence. So, we have 4 forms of knowledge: rational, empricial, transcendental, and existential. (Yes, this is also based on Scotus, though he like other Aristotelians would explain the difference between "transcendental" and "rational" knowledge differently).

Arguments against a World Partition

While I'm on a roll, I figure I'll jot down what I have so far for my views on the relation between logic and reality. I'm trying to find some way of arguing for the position, or at least making it clearer; I'm attempting to balance listening to my intuitions with a desire to communicate clearly to others and be sufficiently critical of myself. So, here's the argument.

As stated earlier in my post on individuation and logic, logic requires individuals: things which are undivided in themselves (law of identity) and divided from everything else. I mentioned that this entails a partition of the world. I intend this in a mathematical sense: any application of logic would entail a partition P, which is a set of elements {a, b, . . ., z} such that for every x and y in P, the intersection of x and y is the null set, and the union of everything within P is the universe (everything, pretty much). The disjointment thesis I take to follow readily from the law of non-contradiction (there is an exact isomorphism between logic and set theory, from which I get the idea of a partition, where "and" -> "union", "or" -> "intersection", "not" -> complement, "false" -> "null set", and "true" -> "universal set").

The universality thesis I take to be a bit harder to prove. It's easy if you allow the law of the excluded middle, but as that is contentious I propose a different proof. Let's say that the union of all the elements in P does not contain everything. Then, there is something in the universe which is not in P (P', or ~P, or something of the sort). But then we can form the partition R from the union of P and ~P. ~P will be disjoint from everything in P, and so everything in R will be disjoint from everything else. Further, the union of P and ~P now does contain everything and by definition is the universal set. Therefore, R is the partition which we were looking for. I guess this ends up being an argument for the law of the excluded middle if one adopts the strict logical starting point.

So, my first argument is simply this: I don't see why I am forced to believe that this accurately describes the universe. Therefore, I am entitled to pursue a different research project. This I take to be the solidest, though of course least persuasive position.

The second argument is that it is possible that the universe does not hold up to such a partition. If this is possible, it is possible in some possible world. But if it is possible in some possible world, then (assuming our modal logic is at least reflexive) from that world it would be possible that the universe could be partitioned. If it is possible that the universe could be partitioned, then this would create a partitioning from the standpoint of that world. So the universe would be partitioned from the standpoint of that world, and it would not be true there that the universe would be non-partitioned. Therefore, if it is possible for the world to be non-partitioned, then it is non-partitioned. Ergo, etc. I think I'm playing fast and loose with the modal stuff here, and I need to work out details at some point, but that's at least the broad outline.

The third argument is the least developed. I'm not sure whether it confirms or denies my senior paper (which was on the inapplicability of Goedel's Theorem to reason; the key ambiguity being the definition of reason). More or less, here is how it would go: the elements in our partition would be isomorphic to some formal system which can express arithmetic. This is due to the fact that any decent partition actually deals with arithmetic and other mathematical facts. However, in this case Goedel's Theorem applies, and there exists some truth in the universe which has not been accounted for. But the partition was supposed to be universal. I think that I may be equivocating on "universal" throughout the various definitions, and this gets into the problem of the one and the many (is "universal" the most general thing underlying everything, or is it the collection of all the particulars?). Of course, I think this problem gives a pretty good impetus to the rejection of partitioning itself.

So, not really any fully developed ideas, but some which I have been batting around.

Suzuki on Logic

Currently reading:
Apologia Pro Vita Sua
   by John Henry Newman
Zen and Japanese Culture
   by D. T. Suzuki

I've been reading through Suzuki, and he's been making some points about logic which both intrigue and infuriate me. I'll try to cover why he is (at times) so anti-logic, the points at which I have my sympathies, and the points at which I think he is way off.

The first reason why Suzuki is against intellectualizing the world is nothing terribly particular to Zen. He claims that in conceptualizing things, we can lose track of the things themselves; what we really need is direct acquaintance with reality. I call this the practical anti-logic thesis: avoid logic if it is causing you to get caught up in the words instead of the reality. Ok, fine; but I find that to be pretty obvious advice. That's not to say that I don't get caught up in concept fixation at times, but I already recognize that as less than ideal. Any church I walk into will stress the need for a personal involvement instead of just a "head knowledge" of the faith.

So, there has to be more to Suzuki's position than this, though the above plays a pretty significant role (I may do a post sometime on his view of subjectivity). And this is were what I call the ontological anti-logic thesis steps in: the world just is not conducive to logical analysis. Note that, as I have been saying in previous posts, this does not entail that the law of non-contradiction is false. Suzuki doesn't care enough about abstracta to deal with that question. All that has to hold is that any application of logic distorts the world. The world is a totality, but not in a pantheistic way; full of particulars which each possess their source equally. I'm not quite sure what he's talking about either, but I don't see anything prima facie wrong with stating that reality is neither one nor many. Sure, such a reality would not fit into any nice categories of ours, but why should I assume that it would?

In connection with this, there seems to be two main places where logic breaks down throughout different philosophical schools, and upon which I think Suzuki and the Buddhist tradition draw. One is when dealing with human conceptual constructions. Of course, if we create the conceptual scheme, then there is no guarantee that it will prove consistent. Further, the scheme may end up being practical even if it fails logical tests; it may even be conducive to learning the truth about the way the world is (I should hope so; I doubt that my thoughts ever will be fully coherent, but I would like to think that I'll achieve something in my searches). So it may even make sense to hold to a contradiction, because although it is imperfect, it could be better than any other option we see. This is even more true if reality simply isn't conducive to logical analysis, in which case we need something (however imperfect) by which to communicate to others with our feeble attempts. The second area where logic seems to break down is with the will; but that is a different series.

So, given all of this, where do I have problems with Suzuki? With his emphasis on creative freedom instead of order. If conceptual schemata are all under a curse, it seems that there should be a place for form as well as formlessness (as in Mahayana Buddhism, form is formlessness, and vice versa). Zen monasteries are some of the most rigid out there. And my particular beef with Suzuki is the prioritizing of the creative artist's approach to an intuitive grasp of reality, while denigrating the analytic approach. As a former mathematician and a wannabe mediaevalist, I firmly disagree. Much of my life is about reaching and expressing my intuitive insights through logic. At times I fall apart into an illogical muddle, but this is hardly when I am at my best and when I have the clearest intuitions about reality. Rather, it is in the midst of Galois theory when I have a mystical vision of the beguiling, entrancing wholeness of all form, or in the subtleties of the Doctor Subtilis that I have my most encompassing vision of the reality of God as the ultimate final, efficient, and exemplar cause of all, the source of all harmony and diversity within unity. To posit such a sharp distinction between logical analysis and intuitive feeling is opposed to Suzuki's very project of removing dualities.

Principles of Sufficient Reason and Parsimony

I'm about to head off to the Scotus Congress in a few hours, so I thought that I'd jot down this thought before I go and absorb the subtle doctor for 4 days. It's probably something that has been noted before, but it has struck me as new, so you can smile and nod and play along for a couple minutes. There are two principles in philosophy which play a significant, though controversial, role. One is the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), which more or less states that there's got to be a reason for everything. On the other hand, there is the principle of parsimony (PoP) (also called "Ockham's Razor," "Scotus' Rule," and most likely other things) which says that we shouldn't postulate more entities than we need. Which therefore makes it the contrapositive of the former (and thus logically equivalent). Observe (where "E(x)" is "x exists" and "R(y)" is "there is a reason that y", ~ is not, and -> is implication):
PSR: E(x) -> R(E(x))
PoP: ~R(E(x)) -> ~E(x)
Granted, PoP is sometimes epistemological (don't postulate more entities than you have found a need for), but this seems to piggyback on the metaphysical claim (why should we choose the simpler explanation unless this gets closer to the reality of things?) So, on that note, if we expect the world to be strongly rational, then it also needs to be as simple as possible.

Now, maybe we think that PSR is too strong; maybe we want WPSR, the weak principle of sufficient reason, which can be stated as "if it is possible that there is a reason for x, then there is a reason for x." What would we get for an equivalent WPoP (where P is possible and N is necessary)?
WPSR: P(R(x)) -> R(x)
WPoP: ~R(x) -> ~P(R(x)); ~R(x) -> N(~R(x))
So, whatever cannot be explained, necessarily cannot be explained. I'm not sure that this is terribly profound; it seems like what it means for something to be explainable. But if WPoP is trivial, that means that WPSR is true.

The above seems to make R somewhat similar to the necessity operator (and WPSR smacks of a cross between an ontological and a cosmological argument), which I find intriguing, although I do note that ~R(x) isn't interchangeable for P(~x) (in fact, God is the main possibly-unexplainable entity, and I certainly don't want to say that God can't exist). So what are the relations between explainability (as an ontological feature, where things really do have some such relation between them) and necessity?

And now I'll let the reader make something coherent and profound out of the above, and attribute it to me (let me know about it). Ah, the rewards of obfuscation and pedanticness.

On Logic

I must say that I tend to waffle between logical and mystical modes, and I'm finding more comfort from the mystical right now. Of course, this requires some justification (at least, I have to justify it to myself), so here's my presentation of my thoughts on logic, and a relation between reason and experience.

In order for the rules of logic to apply, we must have a ontology of individuals; that is, things which are undivided in themselves (for the rule of identity to hold) and which are divided from everything else (for the rule of non-contradiction). Now, it is precisely this ontology which is denied in the strands of thought which claim to surpass logic. I would suggest that an ontology of individuals does not properly account for causation (things wouldn't really be divided from everything else) or for change (things wouldn't really be undivided in themselves).

Of course, theories which talk about things in terms of individuals seem to work, and logic just seems so necessary.* This would be because we can make practical distinctions, and within that practical world logic holds. I can say that the table in front of my exists. Now, if it were to really exist as an individual, then we would need to face the problem of providing boundaries for it (are the molecules from the air bouncing off of it right now and forming quickly-broken electrical bonds part of the table? Where is the point of separation between table and floor? Is that little piece hanging off the edge really part of the table? What about the sorites paradox, e.g. if we cut off molecules from the table, at what point does it stop being this table?). I personally think this problem is insurmountable, and even if the boundary problem is solvable, there is still Trenton Merrick's overdetermination argument (given in Objects and Persons). But practically for my present purposes, I can pick out a table and I can pick out a chair; given this, the table is not the chair, but is itself. The fact that the distinction is practical does not completely make it anti-real: the chair and table may not be individuals, but the very fact that I can make the practical distinction is due to the way reality is. Reality still is, and it is still ordered, just not in a way which lets us grab a hold of it for more than the present moment.**

So it is prima facie possible that the ontology of the real world is such that it cannot (ultimately) be parceled out into the individuals which logic requires. Another problem comes up in the inner realm: what to do when realm and experience/feeling/intuition collide? I would say that in my life, I've been finding that the answer comes in realizing both that this usually ends up being an indication that my reasoning is wrong, but also that my interpretation of the experience is wrong. The experience is like a pain I feel on my arm: the pain doesn't tell me what sort of wound I have, how I got it, whether I was justified in getting it, and so on. It does tell me, however, that I need to do something about it; rationally telling myself that pain doesn't exist is going to cause problems. Likewise, in philosophy and theology, one shouldn't simply follow one's feelings, because these feelings don't really say whether a doctrine is true or false; only the interpretations of the feelings do. However, if I feel uncomfortable with a doctrine, I ignore this discomfort at my peril. I see too much theology done from the standpoint of "it rationally works out, so it doesn't matter how we feel; let's just keep trucking." I'm not so confident of any of our reasoning abilities to completely ignore other signs that we may need to keep looking.

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* - Aristotle would be the best philosopher of individuals of whom I can think, and so he would deserve a post explaining how he fits into all of this. Perhaps another time._Back

** - Yes, I'm sure that there needs to be some way of working out self-reference there. I guess that will be in a sequel post as well._Back