Thesis Topic: Maybe?

I may actually have a working idea for a thesis topic; it wouldn't be the first, or even fifteenth, but it seems the most promising so far. As I have yet to formulate a satisfactory version of the question on its own, the historical genesis of the question may prove more useful (to anyone who hasn't been scared away already). Different traditions refer to a transcendent, ineffable something (or lack of something, or both something and lack of something, or neither something nor lack of something; maybe even all of the above). However, these ineffable transcendents don't seem to be the same (pace Hick); Pseudo-Dionysius, for example, is talking about God while Nagarjuna is talking about the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. Even though surface language appears the same, what allows for this differentiation? Are these thinkers inconsistent, or is there some way to allow for different ineffable transcendents?

To take this a step further, I am looking at Kierkegaard and the Japanese Buddhist Shinran. Both have some degree of apophaticism in their thoughts, and as a consequence stress the inner life of the believer and the way life is lived instead of trying to understand the non-understandable. So the thesis would be looking at a comparative study of these two thinkers, analyzing their solution to the problem of interacting with a transcendent reality, and asking the question of what makes for a Christian life as opposed to a Buddhist life in such frameworks (if there really could be any differentiation; it could turn out to be a reductio for existentialism).

Other than that, I guess there is my life outside of schoolwork too. Joy and I have been taking fencing classes; it's been lots of fun, but it ended last Tuesday :-(. So now we're going to have to look into an intermediate class and/or the fencing club in our area so that we can poke more people with swords.

This Semester

Currently reading: Overcoming Onto-Theology
by Merold Westphal
and
Naming and Necessity by Saul Kripke

What I'm doing this semester:

• TAing for Intro to Philosophy
  1. An interesting class - it's an intro based mainly on Kant, interpreting philosophy through motifs common in his work. I'm getting to know the professor through the job; he's a stereotypical philosophy prof in a lot of ways (eternally befuddled and unorganized, for example), though he's a cool guy. Considers everything philosophical to come back to Kant (hence the focus of the course).
• Reading course on Duns Scotus
  1. Understudied medieval philosopher, when he's on I think he's even more brilliant than Aquinas. However, he doesn't have a systematic work which makes him more difficult to read, he's more willing to stop with an appeal to authority, and he tends to be more Catholic than Aquinas on the issues which divide Catholics and Protestants.
• Reading course on Japanese Religion
  1. Shinto, Zen, and Pure Land, mainly; currently I'm researching Shinran, founder of the True Pure Land school of Buddhism. A note on certain Zen writers (such as Abe or Nishitani): Zen is hard to understand. German idealism is hard to understand. The combination somehow succeeds in breaking through most of the boundaries that helped one understand either of the parts at all.
• Courses on Theism and Ethical Theories (haven't had a class for these yet, I'll have more to report later.)

One issue I've been struggling with philosophically as of late is how we can speak of God. One the one hand, it seems good to emphasize his otherness, his transcendence, his, well, God-ness, and certain approaches to theology do this well (negative theology, see Pseudo-Dionysius and Eastern Orthodoxy). However, at the same time, if what we say of God has any meaning at all (or, at least, any meaning of which we can be aware; I guess not quite the same thing, but it might as well be), and also if we take seriously the fact that God has revealed himself to us at least in part through language, there must be something positive that we can say about God, some concept (however basic) which we can apply to both God and creatures. Scotus is a proponent of the latter view, and is currently being trounced by certain groups (i.e. Radical Orthodoxy) because of it. While I still have no clue about where to stay in the balancing act, I will present 2 of his arguments for being able to postively predicate things of God univocally (that is, in the same way we do of creatures):

1. If we can only apply negative statments to God, then every such statement equally can be predicated of nothing. In the end, there is no way to separate God from nothing, and we seem to be crypto-atheists (similar to the problem with John Hick in his theory of religious pluralism).
2. There can be no theory of analogical language unless at some point there can be a common term applying to both God and creatures. If there is no such term, then any term used of God must be used entirely differently then it is used of creatures; analogy breaks down into either a form of univocation or equivocation (this is a summary of the argument; if there is more interest, I can present the full thing later).

Scotus' New and Improved Onto-Cosmological Argument

Edit: This argument is being left up mainly for historical purposes. Even the pared down version which I present below leaves out an important step, and even without this flaw doesn't have the force of the argument which I initially thought I had.

*Danger: Modal Logic Warning*

I've been reading through Scotus' argument for the existence of God, and given the strong modal tendencies of it, I figured I would try to find a version amenable to modern modal logic (not that medieval and modern modal logic are the same, though possible world semantics may be able to be traced back to Scotus' thought). His argument goes essentially like this (greatly simplified - Scotus was always one for details):

1. The are orders of causes in which A causes B to cause anything (essentially ordered causes, as opposed to accidentally ordered causes in which A may cause B in some way but then B can act on its own).
2. It is possible that there is a primary essential cause (there is no contradiction in asserting this).
3. Such a cause would be uncaused.
4. Anything that is uncaused and possible must exist.
5. This primary essential cause must exist.

That at least is the short version. Based on the above, and inspired by Plantinga's version of the ontological argument, I have developed the following

1. It is logically possible that if p is contingent, the contingency of p could imply that necessarily p could (materially) imply G. That is, it is logically possible that given a contingent thing, it would not exist when God does not.
2. If p exists actually and is contingent, then G exists actually.

It seems to have ever so slightly more force than Plantinga's argument. At very least, the main premise here is more confusing and thus provides more stalling time in searching for another argument. However, it still suffers from the defect of not saying much about God. I'll most likely work on a stronger version of the argument to supplement this.

For those who want to see the inner workings (where P indicates possibility, N indicates necessity, and -> indicates material implication):

By reductio:
1) P( (Pp & P-p) -> N(p -> G) ),0 (that is, at world 0) (by hypothesis; though I'm working on an argument for it. I thought I had something, but I had mixed up a P with an N. I wonder how God feels about falling prey to a typo?)
2) p, 0 (by hypothesis)
3) P-p, 0 (by hypothesis)
4) (Pp & P-p) -> N(p -> G), 1 (by possiblity of 1)
5) -G, 0 (reductio hypothesis)
Now, either (N-p v Np), or N(p -> G). If N(p -> G) = N(-p v G), then:
6a) N(-p v G), 1
7a) -p v G, 0
both of which lead to contradictions (by 2 and 5). Next, let us look at (N-p v Np). First, N-p:
6b) N-p, 1
7b) -p, 0
which leads to a contradiction by 2. Finally, Np:
6c) Np, 1
7c) -p, 2 (by 3)
8c) p, 2
Another contradiction. Therefore, if there is anything which exists and is contingent, and it is logically possible that there could be something which always exists when something contingent exists, then that thing actually exists. Put more strongly, if it is logically possible that God would exist whenever something contingent exists, then God exists.

Musings on Philosophy

Currently reading:
Bonaventure: The Soul's Journey into God
The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus edited by Thomas Williams
The Drama of Docrine by Kevin Vanhoozer

My reading list is constantly growing; I've just put a couple books up there now which I am currently going through, with a bunch more currently sitting on a table in the lounge outside my room. Drama of Doctrine in particular I'm finding to be interesting; it's addressing some of my concerns in the last post, so maybe I'll be able to find another way out. (I never said I liked the conclusions I reached, merely that they were the ones I reached).

In the meantime, I've been thinking about the purpose of philosophy. I currently have two musings. I do not claim that these are my full thoughts on the matter; throw in appropriate nuances and such as you see fit:

1. The purpose of philosophy is explication. I should not be trying to come up with some new idea, some fundamentally new, counter-intuitive way of looking at the world; I should be looking for a way to present what we already know, in a way that gives us greater understanding and insight. This can require creativity and looking at the world in a "new" way, but only if it in the end is another explication of what we already know.

2. The relationship between reason and emotion: in this life, reason should be primary, but not because it is intrinsically better. In fact, it would be better to be able to rely on our affections and direct vision, and these will shoulder out reason in the life to come. However, in the meantime, we are cripples due to the pervasiveness of sin, with both our reason and affections weakened. A cripple who runs will fall flat on her face; rather, the cripple should walk slowly and methodically. This does not remove the chance of falling, but lessens it and provides opportunity for catching ones balance. Similarly, the methodicalness of reason better suits it for dealing with our errors (though see my post on Reason and Creativity below; I'm only presenting one side here), though as we grow strong through God's grace in love and holiness, we can start taking larger steps. Reason is therefore necessary and should guide us the most in the early stages, but like Virgil in Dante's Divine Comedy it can only lead us so far until Beatrice, representing love, has to take over.

At the same time, I would like to affirm some words by Bonaventure:
First, therefore, I inivite the reader to the groans of prayer through Christ crucified, through whose blood we are cleansed from the filth of vice - so that he not believe
that reading is sufficient without unction,
speculation without devotion,
investigation without wonder,
observation without joy,
work without piety,
knowledge without love,
understanding without humility,
endeaveor without divine grace,
reflection as a mirror without divinely inspired wisdom.

Theology Quiz Revisited

Since the theological quiz went around here, I took it again to see where I stand now that I know something about the issues. The results, as compared to last year's, were:

Then

Now

You scored as Evangelical Holiness/Wesleyan. You are an evangelical in the Wesleyan tradition. You believe that God's grace enables you to choose to believe in him, even though you yourself are totally depraved. The gift of the Holy Spirit gives you assurance of your salvation, and he also enables you to live the life of obedience to which God has called us. You are influenced heavly by John Wesley and the Methodists. Evangelical Holiness/Wesleyan - 79% Roman Catholic - 75% Neo orthodox - 71% Reformed Evangelical - 61% Classical Liberal - 57% Emergent/Postmodern - 54% Fundamentalist - 39% Charismatic/Pentecostal - 21% Modern Liberal - 18%

You scored as Neo orthodox. You are neo-orthodox. You reject the human-centredness and scepticism of liberal theology, but neither do you go to the other extreme and make the Bible the central issue for faith. You believe that Christ is God's most important revelation to humanity, and the Trinity is hugely important in your theology. The Bible is also important because it points us to the revelation of Christ. You are influenced by Karl Barth and P T Forsyth. Neo orthodox - 93% Evangelical Holiness/Wesleyan - 86% Emergent/Postmodern - 79% Roman Catholic - 75% Reformed Evangelical - 68% Fundamentalist - 32% Classical Liberal - 32% Modern Liberal - 18% Charismatic/Pentecostal - 18%

Am I the only Taylorite that is not an Evangelical Holiness/Wesleyan any more? Though at the same time, I actually seem to have become more convinced of the view and of the importance of holy living through God's power (figures that out of a school of almost entirely Calvinistic professors, the most influential one on me would be the lone Wesleyan; I guess the truth makes itself known, eh, Scott?), though even more convinced of the centrality of Christ and the importance of the Trinity.

Omniscience and Cantor

I found an interesting debate between Plantinga and Grim, a mathematician on the possibility of omniscience (or anything else that would entail a quantification over all propositions): http://www.sunysb.edu/philosophy/faculty/pgrim/exchange.html. I'm working on a couple of ways around Grim's argument. One is Plantinga's approach, which I think merely leads to the idea that the set of valid properties is, at best, recursively enumerable (that it, there is no decision procedure for determining falsehood); an altogether unremarkable claim. Another is what is called the Skolem paradox, which some think show that levels of infinity are really relative, and as such a universal set I think could be exempt from a Cantorian argument; in fact, such a set could even be defined as one which cannot be put into correspondence with itself. However, I need to do some research as it could be possible that this interpretation of the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem has already been laid to rest. A third way is through an anti-Wittgensteinian maneuver: the world is made up of things, not facts. Fourthly, while Grim shows that there's a set of properties which cannot be put into one-to-one correpspondence with propositions, thereby entailing a new proposition, I think an argument can be made that there are at the same time at least as many propositions as properties, and even as many as their power set, their power set's power set, and so on, so there must be more propositions than powers. This doesn't solve the problem, but shows that there must be one somewhere within the argument. Finally, I guess one could resort to a form of nominalism, though I am hestitant to be a nominalist about abstract objects (physical objects I am ok with). I might buy TCR (theistic creative realism), which states that reality for God is nominalistic (though as opposed to theistic activism, he doesn't create logical laws - I need to see how this fits), which leads to a realism from our perspective.

Retraction, Sickness, and Philosophy

Currently reading:

Depth of the Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends
by S. Mark Heim
Till We Have Faces
by C. S. Lewis

Probably should put retractions first, so I will say that I was a bit unfair to Cragg in my previous post. I still don't agree with his approach, I think that it does lead to a confusion of the gospel message, but I have discovered that I misread him; most of what he says is not incompatible with Niceno-Constantinopoletan orthodoxy, but sidesteps that issue in order to not alientate Muslims, while at the same time Cragg is trying to get them to ask themselves the pertinent questions. So I may have to read the book again, but in the meantime I was wrong with my criticisms.

I've been recovering for a the past couple weeks from illness. About half a week to a week into the 2-week class on Christian Encounters with World Religions, I caught a nasty flu. I was better for a day (it was a Tuesday), then I got throat problems. First, I was just feeling tired, demotivated, and had an itchy, scratchy throat. I went to the doctor Friday, who thought I had strep (which I had been beginning to suspect). Friday night it really hit hard, and I was out of comission the entire weekend and most of the following week. For it wasn't strep that I had; that would have been bad enough. I had full-blown tonsilitis, and the type that takes its time to go away. Finally, after being down and out for a week and a half, I was better, though I'm still constantly tired and finding it hard to sit down and concentrate on a book.

In the meantime, I've decided that I'm not sure that I really want to go into comparative religions. The subject material does interest me somewhat, but I'm finding that the discussions I really enjoy are in more analytic stuff, and religious studies programs are tending more and more towards continental philosophy. I want to be conversant with the continentals, but I don't think that I could be doing my main work in it. Thus, my current prognosis of what I want to do is philosophy of religion, maybe working with modal logic and philosophical theology. I think that it would be cool to work under Thomas Flint at Notre Dame, though I don't know that I could actually get in there.

Beginning of Studies

Currently reading: Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation by St. Thomas Aquinas, edited by Timothy McDermott, as well as: The Myth of the Eternal Return by Mircea Eliade, translated by Jonathan Z. Smith

I'm settling back into seminary life, a good deal more refreshed now. I actually feel excited about learning again - which is good, because I have a lot of it to do. I signed up at the last minute for the class "Christian Encounters with World Religions," dropping Systematic Theology II. This class will meet M-F from 8 to noon starting next Monday for a week and a half, and I need to have all of the reading done beforehand. It should be interesting; it's focusing on what happens when Christianity is introduced into regions that hold to other religions (hence the title of the course), with different views on what should be done.

I read a book by Shuusaku Endou called Silence which is a novel concerning a 17th century Portuguese missionary in Japan. It was a very good book that brings out the struggles and turmoil of the missionary and the people, though I don't agree with the ideology presented by Endou at the end. Despite this reservation, throughout the book the point was more the struggle that the missionary had rather than what the answer to that struggle was, and even the answer Endou used gave some food for thought.

This is in contrast to Jesus and the Muslim by Kenneth Cragg, which I did not care for too much. (Warning: rant ahead, skip to next paragraph to avoid.) The stated point was to look at Jesus in the Qu'ran and Islamic tradition (which was interesting) and compare this portrait to that of Jesus in the New Testament and Christianity. Unfortunately, I think I recognized this image less than the Islamic one. It wasn't just that Cragg wrote about a "unitarian liberal" Jesus, it was that he implied that this was the historic, orthodox view, fitting with both the New Testament (as intended by the authors) as well as Christian tradition, including the creeds. Now, the study of Jesus in theologically liberal Christianity as compared with Islamic tradition is an interesting study, and if this had been the stated intent I would have probably been much happier with the book. But to say that the authors of the New Testament actually meant that the Resurrection was purely symbolic (without addressing the claims of eyewitnesses to it), as well as engaging in other questionable exegesis to bring out naturalistic views? What particularly boggles me is that Cragg has no problem affirming a God who works in history and can do whatever he wants, but cannot accept the possibility of miracles in any form. It was somewhat comforting, though, to see that I really have as little to fear from theologically liberal Biblical scholarship as I have read in places like Plantinga. I'm also glad that I had already read God Crucified by Richard Bauckham and thus had a grasp on how strongly the New Testament does point to the divinity of Christ. (Good book in New Testament scholarship, btw - I may do a post on it sometime.)

Ok, I have that rant off of my chest now. It needs to be here, because I'll have to be nice on my book review that I turn into class. I'm thinking about building another blog or website to house philosophical arguments with which I am working, as well as a site to place research material I've found and other sources on some topics. Maybe I won't scare away as many people from this blog then? (listens to crickets chirping.) I guess I can't complain too much about perceived lack of readership - I'm horrible about posting on other people's blogs myself, though I still enjoy reading what is happening with them and what they are thinking. Anyhow, it's time to talk to Joy now :-D, so signing out...

Oh, I almost forgot the new "random quote" section. For this blog's quote, said after a bad introduction to a person who had been a potential date, "that was the worst trainwreck since Origen's soteriology."

Back from Break and All's Well, er, better

Currently reading: Idea of the Holy by Rudolf Otto

I had a bit of a depressive episode at the end (that is, last couple months) of last semester. Man does not live on academic books alone, but that was what was constantly flooding my mind. Break was therefore much needed. My mom and Joy even teamed up to, um, entreat me to stop analyzing and reading for a couple days (read: they took my books and wouldn't let me sit and think for any length of time).

I had been struggling with what I should be doing in the future. Is it possible that there is a life outside of academia? I was incredulous when this was suggested, but I looked and found a whole new world (cue Aladdin music). I even took a couple days to entertain the notion of becoming a chef. Then I regained my senses (largely after getting advice from my uncle), and returned to the straight and narrow path of the books. Though after break, my goal is to spend more time living in the moment and enjoying what I'm doing now rather then trying to force every waking moment into a plan which most likely will be uprooted either by God or my own flighty interests.

Also, I have been signed up to become an undercover agent, complete with pseudonym. Of course, I could tell you more, but then I'd have to kill you.