The True or the Good?

Is it more important to seek what is good, or what is true? What is good can only be good is it really, truly is good, and so it seems that truth is preeminent. But don't we seek the truth because we feel that we ought to do so?

We can imagine situations in which the two can come apart, at least existentially (that is, within the way we live our finite lives on a daily basis) even if not in the end. I'm not simply talking about cases where we would have to kill innocents or sell our souls in order to come by some all-encompassing knowledge; it could be the pursuit of studies instead of helping at the soup-kitchen.

So, we have four cases, given that he two do seem interconnected somehow: (1) goodness is dependent on truth, (2) truth is dependent on goodness, (3) both or dependent on some third thing, and (4) the two are mutually dependent in some way.

If (1) is the case, then contemplation and study should consume most of our time; it is no use acting without knowing what is true first. This view has some plausibility in that virtues without wisdom can often be harmful. Courage, for example, even with the best intentions, can produce a monster if it is not guided by a knowledge of its proper use.

If (2) is the case, then we should primarily be acting in the world. It does seem that the person spending all of her time in study is missing the point, and is less of a human being than the one who is out there enacting justice (although this of course betrays my non-classical aesthetic sensibilities). If so, then it is plausible that the truth comes second to enacting good.

If (3) is the case, then we have a way of reconciling the two above options: neither the true nor the good completely trump each other, but rather are both connected to some third source. But, what is this third thing? "Being," whatever that may be? So, this option cannot help us without further elucidation. It's been done in various ways at various times, but that's another topic.

If (4) is the case, then we can avoid some mysterious common source and avoid subordinating one to the other. However, in what way is (4) true? Is there one abstract object one time referred to as the truth and at another time as goodness? But how does this make sense out of our existential conflicts? Another option is a division of labor: for some it is good to give preeminence to truth, and to others a preeminence to goodness. Society overall will be balanced, though individuals may not be (or, individuals themselves may overall be balanced through giving different priorities at different times).

Metaphysical Implications of Logic?

I've been thinking through some assumptions which seem to be entailed by classical logic. I'm sure these have been mentioned in a thousand places, in much better ways (I don't actually blog about what I've taken the time to study; I'm blogging to put off that stuff). However, I am interesting in what people have to say about the following.

Problem #1: Both the law of identity (A=A) and the law of non-contradiction (A /= ~A) require that the same token have two instances. This already assumes that something can be repeated as exactly the same thing in multiple instances (maybe it even implicitly brings in Parmenides?). If everything is simply more or less similar to other things, then this is not obviously true.

Problem #2: The law of non-contradiction assumes that we can truly make negative statements. A is not ~A, where both A and ~A refer to A. Therefore, whatever A is, it cannot be ~A. However, if we always have some positive idea in mind when we make an assertion, then we never do actually refer merely to ~A; we refer to some B, which we take to be ~A. But B is not simply ~A, and refers to something other than A. As such, further investigation into B could show that it is really not incompatible with A, and so our actual use of the law of non-contradiction failed.

For something completely different: I'm currently signing up for classes for next semester. I'm presently planning on taking Kant, Early German Idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Jacobi, Hölderlin, etc.), and Neoplatonism (with an emphasis on how the early NP commentators worked with Aristotle). Should be an interesting semester.

Some Interesting Propositions

I was talking with a fellow Marquette student the other day, and came to the conclusion that we should have a philosophy based on the following principle: that which is interesting, is true.

Now, it would seem from here that things should be true insofar as they are interesting. So what is most boring does not exist, while there are things which are more and more interesting and so more and more true (existent?). Following this, we come to the That Than Which None More Interesting Can Be Thought (TTWNMICBT).

Now, certainly it would be more interesting for such to exist in reality, and so therefore it must actually exist, or it is not the TTWNMICBT. But now, there is a catch. This would suppose that we are thinking of this thing, but surely something would be more interesting if we could not think of it. So the TTWNMICBT cannot be TTWNMICBT; it is only interesting through this That Which Is Too Interesting Too Be Thought (TWITITBT).

So we have the TWITITBT, of which we can't even properly speak, but which we need to explain everything else. Then we have the TTWNMICBT, which is only interesting indirectly. But if the TTWNMICBT wouldn't continually reach out to be more interesting, then it would not be the TTWNMICBT, as there is something more interesting than it. So, now we have the TTWNMICBT considered in itself, and the TTWNMICBT considered in its striving. But since the TTWNMICBT is the TTWNMICBT, any striving must also be toward was is not itself, and so the TTWNMICBT as striving gives us a multiplicity of interesting things.

Ok, someone's been reading too much NeoPlatonism. Back to work....

Election Results

I have a presentation for my Aristotle class in an hour, so I figured that I'd spend some time blogging on something completely unrelated in preparation. The election is over, and Obama will now be our president. And I'm happy for that.

When you get right down to it, no, I don't believe any of his promises. I don't believe any politician's promises; in fact, I consider most people period to be untrustworthy (at least due to competence, if not to outright deceit). So I don't see why that affects Obama more than anyone else. And I am quite fine with his elitism; some people are just better able to handle things than others. Democracy is a necessary evil, as far as I'm concerned. But there are two reasons in particular why I am glad that he was elected.

First, it is good to have an African-American president. When you get right down to it, the leader of a country is important for their symbolic value at least as much as for what they can do, and perhaps even more so; after all, it's still Congress who makes the laws. It's hard to say that we're a diverse country, although every single one of our presidents has not only been a rich white male, but also of either German or British/Celtic stock. That just screams inequality somewhere, and electing someone with a darker shade of skin is at least a preliminary step toward giving a different appearance. The different appearance in turn such encourage more minorities to get involved in the nation, hopefully leading to a more diverse representation in government. So, will all of this happen? Who knows? But if you don't give it a start somehow, then there is no way that it will happen.

Secondly, I must say that I enjoy seeing the pissed off conservatives. Hooray for tearing down the golden conservative calf! Maybe when people see that the country is still standing in 4 years, the Evangelical church (in general) will reconsider their America-worship.... nah. Maybe I'll just be stuck listening to people whining about how abortion is the worst evil of all time while they ignore the widows and orphans.

Ok, that was a cheap shot, which I'll probably regret making; but I'm getting really sick of the pious blogging and Facebook status messages.