I've been thinking about ethics lately, on the relation between the ought-ness of moral statements and the consequences of actions. So, I have a thought experiment here in three stages, and I'm interested in hearing people's opinions on the matter.
First, let us imagine a world in which action F is right and action G is wrong. Maybe we can say that God willed that we do F and nilled G, or maybe it's just there. At any rate, let's say that there are two agents, X and Y, where X does F and Y does G. Now, both X and Y approach these actions with the same attitudes (they both intend to do right, and if these actions are willed to be done by God, then they both intend to fulfill God's will), and there will be no different consequences either in this life or the next for either X or Y. Is it still meaningful to say that F was right, and G wrong?
For the second stage, let's say that X does F, and Y G; God will condemn Y to Hell (or annihilate Y; take your pick) while X gains an eternal reward. However, actions F and G result in the same consequences here in this life (again, assuming that X and Y approach them with the same attitude and all). Can we really say that F is a right action? I guess this is asking whether God would be just in condemning Y for doing G, even though no temporal effects would have distinguished G from F.
Finally, let's say that F and G do differ in consequences, where G produces some good while F does not. In this case, would it be meaningful to say that F is right and G is wrong? If not-F would produce good, would it be meaningful simply to mandate F and anathametize not-F? How about if not-F were as neutral/bad as F? Let us say that this good that G and not-F produces comes from the character of the action (and similarly, the lack of good from F), rather than from accidental circumstances.
2 comments:
Let me respond with some nitpicking before we get any farther:
How strictly am I to interpret there being no difference in consequences for doing F or doing G? In what sense are any two acts two distinct acts if their consequences are indistinguishible?
Perhaps if epiphenomenalism were a true theory of mental states, then two thoughts, beliefs, or intentions could be different without having different consequences in the physical world (since no mental states have any consequences in the physical world on this picture). Then, perhaps, believing X and believing not-X might not be distinguishable in terms of practical consequences but be distinguishable in terms of spiritual consequences, such as whether or not one was condemned or exalted.
Please clarify whether in the third stage you mean:
(a) Some consequences of G is good and no consequence of F is good, or
(b) There is some self-identical good x such that G produces x and F does not produce x.
In the third stage, I mean (a). Though, if you have any interesting comments regarding (b), I'd be willing to hear those too.
As far as the similarity of consequences for F and G are concerned, I've left it deliberately vague; I think that there's an issue in here, but every way which I have of analyzing it ends up tautological or incoherent. Here are three options which might contribute:
(1) They really are completely undistinguishable; after the acts have been performed, exactly the same consequences result. I'm not sure that this is possible, but it would make the thought experiment work the best.
(2) The results are similar enough for practical purposes. Concerning any differences which would result, no one really cares; not the doers, not the doees, not God.
(3) There may be different consequences, but these consequences are exactly similar regarded the amount of good that would obtain (assuming that two different goods could ever be compared in such a way).
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