Phenomenology of Spirit: Perception

It's been a while since I read this section, so hopefully I'll get it correctly enough. I'm going to leave out most of Hegel's argument, because (a) I don't understand it all myself, and (b) to put it all in would be more or less to repeat the Phenomenology. Also, when I compare a stage in Hegel's thought to one philosophy or another, I do not mean that Hegel made this connection, but rather that I think that it helps explain the view (although it's hard to escape the blatant Aristotelianism in part of the next section).

Summary:

1. Movement in Object
1. Many indifferent properties coexisting in universal medium (white, tart, cubical, but each a different, non-interacting quality)
2. However, determinate unity, through exclusion from all else (this white and this tart and this cubical)
3. Properties as properties of One Thing(both universal and determinate)
2. Movement in Consciousness (discovered through possibility of deception)
1. Differences in consciousness breaking up object (e.g. different senses) into in different aspects; we are the universal medium; however, differences are already specifically determined, and so in Thing itself
2. Unity through all the different aspects united in one consciousness
3. Object existing both for-itself and for-an-other, since it is both many determinate properties and also synthesized in consciousness
3. Movement up to Force (due to impossibility of reconciling contradictions within perception)

In this section, Hegel picks up from sense-certainty. Where sense-certainty started with simply the immediate presence of the Here, the Now, and the empirical I, perception starts grouping together sense impressions as different universals (remember that the movements of sense-certainty established all the different This-es as having their reality under the aspect of the universal). We see different sense-impressions together in the same place, and this yields a thing with properties. This first takes the form of a set of different properties (different universals) sharing the same space, but indifferent to each other. An example Hegel gives is salt, in which there exist in the same place white, tart, and cubical, although none of these different qualities really have anything to do with each other yet.

At the same time, the thing differentiates itself from other things, gaining a unity through this negation of everything else. At the same time, the "properties" cease becoming universals and are now determinate through each other; this white is also tart and cubical, etc., unlike other whites. As such, we have a "singular individuality in the medium of subsistence radiating forth into plurality. (P115)"

However, this simultaneous unity and multiplicity, exclusion and determinateness, creates a problem for perception; as any objective Thing would have self-identity, the problems in their contradictory nature must be in our own perception. Therefore, we must revisit these movements (which had been on the side of the object) within our own consciousness. The True, the being-in-itself, is therefore reflected into Consciousness, where we we again analyze it, recompare it to the object, make adjustments, and repeat ad nauseam. The truth of perception ultimately lies within consciousness itself, and unlike apprehension (the step with sense-certainty), perception involves a reflection onto itself.

The differences in the object occur due to our own nature; our difference of senses give rise to the distinction between sight, smell, taste, touch, etc. We ourselves are the universal medium for these properties, which are indifferent to each other. However, these different aspects are all specifically determined through being in the determinate Thing, and so in this way are in the Thing itself; they, however, are indifferent to each other in its thing-hood. At the same time, they gain a unity through being combined in the same consciousness, such that they are distinct only insofar as one is not the other; the salt is white insofar as it is not cubical, cubical insofar as it is not tart, and so on, although these are not actually separate.

The Thing itself is existing in this two-fold way, both as many and one, both as for itself and for another, "and, moreover, it is an other on its own account, just because it is for and other. . . . (P 123)" However, to avoid contradiction, one aspect must be essential and the other non-essential. Hegel goes through the options, showing that there is no essence to be found for the Thing. The Thing is empty, and perception can only work by alternating between the aspects. In order to overcome this, we must move on the the next circle: Force and the Understanding.