Given the day today, I figured that it was only appropriate to post some theses of my own. So, here are some of the points on which I've been struggling, put out for discussion rather than waiting for better exposition and argument. Some of these are new, some are recaps (and exaggerations) of old posts.
- Fideism is morally wrong, as it privelages a group over others by arbitrary means, imposing illegitimate human authorities over non-members.
- Out of four classes of proofs for Christianity, rational, historical, experiential, and moral, there are none which escape fideistic grounding (see earlier posts for criticisms of these proofs).
- One should not do apologetics until one can sympathize with and argue for the other side (or any other sort of criticism, for that matter).
- If theology contains and set truths which are important to know, then it is immoral to let theology be done in a democratic or congregationalist fashion.
- There are no grounds for certainty which can stand up to reasonable criticism, and any claim to certainty can only be bought by ignoring legitimate views.
- Morality is only meaningful insofar as it results in good for fellow creatures.
- God is irrelevant in providing direct grounds for morality, as any real morality must appeal to what would be actually good for me anyhow. God may provide grounds for hoping that my good will be attained along with that of others, however.
- The notion of providence is irrelevant for daily life once it must take care of the actual circumstances of the world.
- The One, it in its hyperperfection, emanates Mind. In turn, Mind in reaching beyond itself yields Soul, who in its striving produces Nature.
3 comments:
A few responses, in no discernable order:
6. Agreed! - as long as we take an appropriately comprehensive view of what will result in good for fellow creatures.
5. Also agreed in principle, but in practice, we can never operate within the bounds of the total rationalism this requires. If we ascribe the label self-authenticating to something as straightforward as simple observation of an object in front of me (and I realize the philosophical baggage this entails), then to some degree, self-authentication is necessary to function. I have a certain appreciation for naive realism.
3. Completely agreed.
8. Are emotions not part of "the actual circumstances of the world"? And can a belief in providence not grant a certain peace to some in difficult situations?
4 and 1 seem to at some level contradict: either some people know what they're talking about more than others, or everyone's equal. I happen to agree with 4 and disagree with 1, but obviously this is easier for a determinist.
So that's about it. Responses?
I more or less agree with you.
6) "Good" is left deliberately vague; whatever it is must be some substantive, concrete (abstract principles w/o particular effects need not apply), and coterminous with being (the good human is more human than the bad one), but I'm open to sources proclaiming what that entails.
5) I'm fine with practical reason dominating our daily lives; I have to choose something, but every choice leaves out other, possibly better choices. When it comes to breakfast, this doesn't matter too much, so I simply go with routine.
I also would say that my daily observations do not say, "This is a computer screen in front of me." Rather, I act within the world without pausing to judge the reality of everything in it. More or less, I don't consider the Matrix to present an illusionary world, but only a real one which doesn't act like we might think upon reflection.
8) Emotions are part of the actual circumstances in the world, but they can be appropriate or inappropriate, and based on good reasons or bad reasons. Peace which comes through bad reasons, is bad peace. So if God really won't make things better, having peace about them is ill-founded.
Concerning 4 & 1) They do conflict; part of the nature of the theses was that I was simply throwing them out there, without any unified plan. One route that I was thinking concerning them was that they present a tragic circumstance in life: we have conflicting ethical commitments. Another was that 1) refers to communal fideism rather than personal. Third, one could say that believing a trustworthy authority (that is, one with a proper relation to the subject matter to constitute knowledge) is not fideism (but I'm skeptical that Evangelicalism has many such authorities, and even those we have often speak outside of their expertise).
Excellent. Sounds like we're on the same page about almost everything.
And an excellent clarification of point 8.
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