Monday, August 03, 2009

The Importance of Argument

A friend remarked to me the other day that philosophers are more concerned about arguments than about the conclusions of those arguments. This, further, must appear nuts to the average person. I remember even talking to a fellow academic, a theology student no less, who could not understand why I insisted on talking about Hume's arguments against causality rather than simply moving on from his position. So, why is argument important?

For one thing, conclusions are always suspect. It's certainly nice to align oneself with a position for a bit; I know that I enjoy the stable self-image that arises from calling myself now a Platonist, now an Idealist. But these conclusions are always changeable; if they were not at least in principle, then we would not be doing philosophy.

Understanding doesn't come from holding certain propositions about the world. It comes from seeing how these propositions are situated, and that is the point of argument. An argument that simply hammers a statement into the opponents head is useless philosophically, though occasionally useful when one just wants the perceived idiots to go away (if nothing else, the obnoxiousness should be effective). Arguments that show in tight, well-understood steps why something would be true show the context under which it exists.

This, in turn, can be more easily adapted to other contexts. A proposition is either true or false, and if false, then it is simply wrong. The web of beliefs supporting it, however, still exist as that web, and they all essentially fit together, and this way of fitting may be similar to other situations. For example, I may have an argument that we have souls, which are simple and so incorruptible. Maybe the conclusion is false. However, as long as the argument is sound, I know what a soul of this sort would be like if it were to exist. This, further, may be applicable to other incorporeal objects, such as numbers or God.

Unsound arguments gain applicability while losing plausibility. Maybe the concept of a conscious, immaterial soul doesn't include simplicity, for example; alternatively, one can look to the sciences, which do not proceed based on deduction. Such arguments do not compel belief in the same way, but allow for greater latitude in analogizing.

If nothing else, a sound argument tells me that the given bunch of properties are a package deal; I have to take them all or leave them all. I therefore learn much more from knowing that a block of ten logically connected propositions are false, than that a single conclusion is so. Similarly, if I accept the conclusion, I now also see a glimpse of a more complete context into which it fits; even if I can't go back and prove the premises from the conclusion, I now have possibilities for further explanation.

Finally, it seems to me that those who want merely the conclusions are really only interested in using the propositions. This seems to me to put them in the position of wanting truth (otherwise why be concerning with firm beliefs in oneself?), but also despising it (since how else would one not care about the true context of a true statement?). As long as one decides to pursue understanding of statements, it seems best to really do so and not fake the process.

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