Friday, October 23, 2009

Standards of Evidence in Religion

Sorry to bog down the blog with another anti-apologetic posting. But I have been thinking about an issue which I think is serious, and I would like to hear some critical thought on the matter. Let's put down issues of the extent to which someone should doubt or be critical of what has been given them on any absolute scale. Let's have a relative standard of evidence: the evidence we ask from history should be comparable to the evidence we ask from our daily lives.

Ask yourself this: what would it take to convince you that someone was genuinely God incarnate, here and now? What would make you leave your religion, as people left their families and ways of life, and eventually Judaism or paganism to follow Jesus? Take this standard of evidence, and apply it to the historical record. If you had four texts claiming to be eyewitness accounts, and reports about people having seen someone rising from the dead, would you go and follow that person? If not, why do you accept the Biblical account?

Note that you cannot simply imagine yourself as someone who was an eyewitness, or receiving secondhand reports. This is not the relation we have to the historical data. It has been mediated to us; at very best, we may have some books of the NT written by eyewitnesses to a significant portion of Jesus' life, and that even is not indisputable. You can't go ask eyewitnesses yourself, because you cannot go ask ask the eyewitnesses whom Paul references. You would have the same distance from the evidence for the person here and now, as you currently have from the life of Jesus. Would you then believe the claims of the next religious leader?

Also, you must compare like cases with like. You can't say, "Well, the evidence claims that Jesus rose from the dead, but this other person only did significant miracles/got reincarnated/etc.", unless you can give a very strong reason why being resurrected is categorically different from the others. I'm not sure that it's even the oddest miracle out there; being both God and man seems to be infinitely greater, if it even makes sense, and I'm not sure what counts as good evidence for that in any time period. At any rate, miracles need to be judged insofar as they are miracles, religious claims need to be judged insofar as they are religious, and so on. If you can't accept some miracle-worker who claims to be a Boddhisattva, then would you really accept claims that some guy got resurrected, showed up to a few people, and alone was identical with the single, categorically-different-from-creation God? The former would seem to require much less evidence, even though its truth would at least be a significant problem for Christianity.

At this point some people may say, "But Scripture tells us to watch out for miracle workers and such," or "Scripture tells us that Christ was it. There is no new revelation." Or related things; fill them in as you like. But, you can't assume what you want to prove. We are weighing the evidence for Christianity here, and so we cannot assume that the Christian story/Scripture/our pastors are correct before looking at the evidence.

Finally, I have heard one concern a few times (worded almost eerily the same; maybe it's coming from some common source?), and it absolutely puzzles me. It goes along of the lines of this: "We don't have any more evidence to give, what do you expect? Why should non-Christians have paid attention to what was going on at the time of the Resurrection, in order to provide an alternative perspective?" But I don't see how this is relevant. I'm asking about whether the evidence we have is sufficient to establish truth, and that has nothing to do (or very little) with what evidence I can expect. Let's take the Riemann Hypothesis in mathematics. It has not yet been proven. Even if it could not be proven, this does not mean that I then can expect to get anywhere by picking the side that seems to have the most evidence. That evidence does not meet the standards for mathematical argument, and becomes completely null and void (unless, perhaps, I am a practiced mathematician with an excellent grasp on related issues, in which case I may have intuitions which would raise my opinion slightly above random guessing). Although history is more complicated and admits of degrees of evidence (as well as corresponding degrees of assent), even if we can't expect more evidence, this doesn't make the evidence we have any more conducive to a decision. Arguing merely from what we can expect, or from what is available, is simply fideism.

So, if you truly and honestly would go and follow some contemporary religious teacher under the same standards of evidence upon which you base your current faith, then I simply ask that you have that integrity. If not, then stop claiming any evidence for your faith: you are a fideist, or a pragmatist, but you do not have the support of rational argument.

4 comments:

S. Coulter said...

So are you saying pragmatists are irrational? :)

Let me try to draw out some questions I can ponder based on your post here:

(1) What evidence do I really have for the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, and how does that compare to the evidence I (might) have for some comparable event in the life of some other religious figure?

(2) What is unique about Jesus' resurrection, such that I might regard it (assuming it happened) as foundational for adherence to Christian faith, while not giving credence to other faiths' foundational events?


(1)
I might be gravely in theological error here. But I regard the resurrection of Jesus as an historical event, and as something that can in principle be witnessed. Similarly historical events include: Muhammad's conquering Mecca, his reciting the Qur'an to his followers, and a group of Tibetan monnks recognizing a child as the new incarnation of Chenrezig. I don't have a problem accepting any of these events as having really happened.

Can you provide a concrete example that you think meets the same evidential standards the resurrection of Jesus could but which you think I would be reticent to accept?

I admit I am skeptical about the child who is recognized as Chenrezig's incarnation actually being an incarnation. Is this inconsistent with my accepting the apostles' recognizing Jesus' risen form as such?

Both in the story of Mary of Magdala at the tomb and the story of the disciples on the way to Emmaus, it is said that the disciple(s) do not recognize Jesus until after it is revealed to them. This suggests a supernatural element to their recognition of Jesus, so that judging its accuracy is probably beyond my ability. The monks who claim to recognize Chenrezig are perhaps on an equal footing here.

But, then, the disciples weren't looking for Jesus to be resurrected, were they? The monks are actively looking for the new Dalai Lama. And if the man Mary spoke to, or the disciples on the way to Emmaus spoke to, was not Jesus, who was he? Where did he come from? These problems don't seem to arise in the case of recognizing Chenrezig.

My acceptance of the resurrection account in the canonical Gospels / the Christian tradition probably has much to do with (a) my lack of imagination in coming up with alternative explanations for those accounts, and (b) my lack of awareness of similar accounts from other religious traditions that might present epistemic challenges to my Christian credulity. But maybe you can give me some more help here? Not that you bear an onus of proof here. But I need help to follow your line of thinking further at this point.

S. Coulter said...

[continued]

(2)
Being already located within the stream of Christianity as I am, it is difficult for me to step outside and take a look at the resurrection from an external perspective.

The early followers of Jesus of course had their own epistemic location(s) influencing their understanding of the story of Jesus' resurrection, whether they were Jews or God-fearers, disciples of Jesus, or not. Resurrection had a particular theological significance in Jewish apocalyptic theology.

Am I epistemically obligated to take an artificial step outside of my own framework, or that of 1st century Jewish apocalypticism, in order to assess the resurrection's significance? I'm not sure I am -- that's my pragmatism & anti-foundationalism coming out.

But what if I try, for the sake of trying to reason together with you?

If I grant Jesus really did die and rise again from the dead, what should I make of this? Well, his followers seem to present a coherent account of its significance -- do I have good reason not to accept that? Is there another account that is more plausible?

Since plausibility is relative (I would contend) to one's epistemic situation, and since this is an artificial exercise, a lot would seem to depend on what epistemic situation I am imagining myself into.

Maybe a Hindu would be perfectly justified in regarding Jesus as yet another manifestation / incarnation of God -- that is, Brahman, Vishnu, Krishna, or whatever/whomever. And so a Hindu wouldn't be rationally compelled, necessarily, to buy the whole apostolic package, just because she bought the resurrection claim.

But again, that is not really my epistemic situation. Does the fact that a Hindu might be justified in not accepting Christian doctrines entail that I am not justified in accepting them? I don't think so -- but maybe you think I'm being an irrational pragmatist.

I think the relevant question for a Peirce-style pragmatist would be: Am I suppressing doubts that should arise naturally, and illicitly fixing my beliefs in a way that makes me comfortable in my social setting? Or is it really the case that my belief structure is stable enough to withstand the possibility of a rational Hindu who accepts the resurrection account in the NT Gospels?

Back to you, Michael. I think I can learn more from your response.

S. Coulter said...

One more thought about this:

The early disciples of Jesus didn't really abandon one faith for another in response to the resurrection; they transformed their understanding of certain bits of their Jewish faith to make sense of what they experienced of Jesus.

Similarly, if I were to encounter a miracle claim of similar signifiance, I would be more likely (out of my present epistemic situation) to transform my understanding of certain bits of my Christian, monotheistic faith to make sense of it than I would be to jettison Christianity wholly in favor of a new religion.

M. Anderson said...

Sorry for taking so long to respond to your last comment, and let me know if you want more response to your other comments as well.

While the disciples would certainly have seen their devotion to Jesus as a necessary outgrowth of their Judaic faith, the communities around them did not. Similarly, we have controversies today over how compatible Christianity is with Zen meditation and pluralism. So, what would it take for someone to move beyond the faith offered to them by their community when that puts them at odds with that community?