Continuing from the last post, I think that I've pinpointed a little bit more clearly what is going on when I reject claims of the self-defeating nature of certain views. Now, when one claims that someone is being inconsistent, they can refer to the language as being inconsistent, the concepts as being inconsistent, or a claim that the world is inconsistent. Further, the assumption seems to be that these three claims are more or less equivalent. But I disagree, and the inconsistencies I raise do not seem to be harmful ones.
Inconsistency in language, if by itself, doesn't seem pernicious. Inconsistent statements have some sort of meaning, as evidenced by the fact that people sometimes find them to be the most useful way of conveying a message. We can argue about their efficacy, but that they are meaningful is clear (they are meaningful to someone, at least; chances are, if you don't get them, it's your problem and not the other person's). And it would seem that concepts would work the same way, when considered independently of language.
The problem comes in when inconsistency in language or concepts would imply such an inconsistency in the world, which is nonsense. But why assume that an inconsistency in language implies that one claims a similar inconsistency in the world? There is an assumption of an isomorphism between world, language, and concepts. All three can be broken up into pieces which interrelate, whatever these pieces may be (perhaps form, matter, and esse, for example, where each of these can stand for a word, a concept, and an external reality). The interrelations in the world mirror those in language and concepts, and language and concepts can be made more or less precise enough to accurately mirror the world.
If there is such an isomorphism, then contradictions in language and concepts do seem to be problematic. But why assume the isomorphism in the first place? This is an assumption, and there seems to be no reason why it shouldn't be examined as well, especially when it is advanced as a weapon in some apologist's arsenal. Why can't we say that the world is a seamless whole, which nevertheless lends itself to being talked about and thought about in some way? Language and concepts are discursive, and reality is not (in this thought experiment), but that doesn't mean that language and concepts are worthless or meaningless. The point of them is a certain sort of interaction with reality, of which ultimately they are a part as well (and even here, I must use "part" language, which isn't accurate, but it may be a useful approximation for those with eyes to see). Contradictions in language then do not entail contradictions in reality. Assuming that contradictions in language do not entail anything whatsoever (and I see no reason to assume without argument that language works like a formal logical system), then why not allow contradictions?
Someone might say at this point, that it is only confused language which breaks the law of contradiction; phrases in such language might mean something, but the whole does not. Logic is the judge of language, whether language follows its laws or not. But why should we assume that? Logic is basically set theory, and works for those relationships capable of being modeled on sets. It is not clear to me that all philosophical relationships must be so clear and set-like; why assume that anything philosophical must therefore be able to be made clear, precise, and analytical?
And the next argument: "but the negation of the law of contradiction entails the law of contradiction; therefore it must be true", is pure sophistry. Not only does it not seem to be "true" anymore once one has negated it, but also, I am saying that language goes beyond precise boundaries. To revert to an argument that "the law of contradiction is either true or false" is already to miss the linguistic and ontological move I am making. In another way, the argument for the law of non-contradiction it is to assume the law of the excluded middle, as well as predicates for which both apply. I deny the law of the excluded middle too, or at least its applicability to any and all meaningful phrases.
Finally: "But with what you are saying, you can say anything and get away with it. This is just a ploy to avoid any criticism." No, it is a recognition that simply pointing out formal flaws has never been good philosophy. Look at the substance; to the reality itself! Logic is the handmaiden of true thinking, and not vice versa. We are engaged in far too difficult a program here to simply sort out arguments and thought based on cosmetic issues.
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