On Logic

I must say that I tend to waffle between logical and mystical modes, and I'm finding more comfort from the mystical right now. Of course, this requires some justification (at least, I have to justify it to myself), so here's my presentation of my thoughts on logic, and a relation between reason and experience.

In order for the rules of logic to apply, we must have a ontology of individuals; that is, things which are undivided in themselves (for the rule of identity to hold) and which are divided from everything else (for the rule of non-contradiction). Now, it is precisely this ontology which is denied in the strands of thought which claim to surpass logic. I would suggest that an ontology of individuals does not properly account for causation (things wouldn't really be divided from everything else) or for change (things wouldn't really be undivided in themselves).

Of course, theories which talk about things in terms of individuals seem to work, and logic just seems so necessary.* This would be because we can make practical distinctions, and within that practical world logic holds. I can say that the table in front of my exists. Now, if it were to really exist as an individual, then we would need to face the problem of providing boundaries for it (are the molecules from the air bouncing off of it right now and forming quickly-broken electrical bonds part of the table? Where is the point of separation between table and floor? Is that little piece hanging off the edge really part of the table? What about the sorites paradox, e.g. if we cut off molecules from the table, at what point does it stop being this table?). I personally think this problem is insurmountable, and even if the boundary problem is solvable, there is still Trenton Merrick's overdetermination argument (given in Objects and Persons). But practically for my present purposes, I can pick out a table and I can pick out a chair; given this, the table is not the chair, but is itself. The fact that the distinction is practical does not completely make it anti-real: the chair and table may not be individuals, but the very fact that I can make the practical distinction is due to the way reality is. Reality still is, and it is still ordered, just not in a way which lets us grab a hold of it for more than the present moment.**

So it is prima facie possible that the ontology of the real world is such that it cannot (ultimately) be parceled out into the individuals which logic requires. Another problem comes up in the inner realm: what to do when realm and experience/feeling/intuition collide? I would say that in my life, I've been finding that the answer comes in realizing both that this usually ends up being an indication that my reasoning is wrong, but also that my interpretation of the experience is wrong. The experience is like a pain I feel on my arm: the pain doesn't tell me what sort of wound I have, how I got it, whether I was justified in getting it, and so on. It does tell me, however, that I need to do something about it; rationally telling myself that pain doesn't exist is going to cause problems. Likewise, in philosophy and theology, one shouldn't simply follow one's feelings, because these feelings don't really say whether a doctrine is true or false; only the interpretations of the feelings do. However, if I feel uncomfortable with a doctrine, I ignore this discomfort at my peril. I see too much theology done from the standpoint of "it rationally works out, so it doesn't matter how we feel; let's just keep trucking." I'm not so confident of any of our reasoning abilities to completely ignore other signs that we may need to keep looking.

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* - Aristotle would be the best philosopher of individuals of whom I can think, and so he would deserve a post explaining how he fits into all of this. Perhaps another time._Back

** - Yes, I'm sure that there needs to be some way of working out self-reference there. I guess that will be in a sequel post as well._Back