Thursday, March 20, 2008

Thought--Stream on Strange's "Calvinist Response"

I've been working through the book Universal Salvation? The Current Debate, and I have some thoughts on the articles that I've been reading; however, this present one is starting to get my blood boiling and, combined with the presence of a computer, I figure that I'll actually get a response out. I've found all of these in many other places, and they are by and large part of the reason why I will no longer touch most works written by Calvinists. Please excuse the polemic, but I'm awfully tired of the smug assurance that certain theologians have when it comes to offering their views, and the way in which these statements are taken to be so self-evident to so many in the church.

  • I really don't like it when Calvinists (Augustinians?) co-opt divine sovereignty and the "Godness" of God; as if affirming those automatically meant that one had to agree with them!
  • Tied to this, Strange posits that there one either has a God-centered theology or a man-centered one. Not only does this seem to me to plainly be a false dichotomy (what if God has eternally elected to be for us, to use Barth's phrase?), but "God-centered" theologies of any sort seem to me to be excuses for letting one's own preconceptions of God and God's word run wild with impunity, to resist letting one's theology be open to the Other and instead remaining in one's own little comfortable space, with answers to all of life's major questions.
  • If, as Strange notes, all sin is ultimately against God, then why doesn't this count for the Arminian/Universalist case? If it is against God, then God could be free to forgive it. But all this is, of course, brushed away because Talbott does not "truly understand the sinfulness of sin." I still fail to see why God can't be big enough to overlook insults; it seems to me like this "God-centered" theology" is still reliant on human concerns. (Note: it could be that there would be other reasons for Hell and for eternal punishment, I just don't think that the whole honor thing or the "de-godding God" line work.) Considering that God does this for some, it doesn't seem like that big a step to say that He could (whether or not He does) do it for all. But, I guess I'm just not "counter-cultural" enough to appreciate God's nature.
  • "My fear is that in rejecting the concept of retributive punishment, the cross loses much of its meaning and power, a fear shared by other Calvinist thinkers...." Granted, the problem of atonement is a sticky one, and Talbott (the main universalist in the collection of essays) may not really be able to provide for penal substitution (though this is not the only form of substitutionary atonement, and one must also wrestle with the extent to which the Biblical passages on the matter are literal descriptions of how are sins have been borne away, and the extent to which they are metaphors, analogies to help us to understand without nailing down a given system). However, is the cross the only part of Christ's life which is salvific? As one of my professors puts it, could Christ have come down at the beginning of Holy Week and simply gone through that in order to save us? Or does the Incarnation have a role to play as well, not to mention the Resurrection? Doesn't the cross gain much of its power from the larger narrative? If so, though, then there is no reason to assume that other emphases must take away from the message of the cross.
  • Also, regarding the notion that "propitiation . . . is the most important concept because of its Godward reference.": Is this all it takes to be a "God-centered theology"? Wasn't the point of Christ's advent his becoming nothing? Isn't the nature of God shown in self-giving love as well, and so therefore in his being for humanity, despite having been sinned against? Peppering a theology with piety does not make it true, or even God-honoring.
  • "What do we mean when we say that God is love? From the perspective of God's essential and necessary being, this must be referring to the intratrinitarian love the divine Persons share with each other." People can judge my likely state of mind from the previous comments. I would like to add that the Bible is not a book of metaphysics; and metaphysical entailments which it carries (aside from things like "God exists") generally must be pretty carefully exegeted. It would be perfectly fine to say that "God is love," in natural speech and to be affirming God's identity as He has willed Himself to be toward us, and not His essential being-in-Himself. To claim that God's love for Himself must be the only thing suggested by this passage as following from "soli Deo Gloria" is just mistaken, though I do agree that God's self-love is not narcissism.
  • Strange quotes approvingly from Helm and Jenson: "A justice that could be unilaterally waived would not be justice, and a mercy which could not be unilaterally waived would not be mercy." On the contrary: if one steps away from the legalistic, externalist approach to justice and mercy, as if they are attributes that can only depending on what else has or has not been done and are instead intrinsic qualities of agents/actions, then justice and mercy have nothing to do with being waived or not. Justice is righting wrongs, and mercy is simply reaching down to help someone worse off (I can have mercy on people who have never wronged me as well as those who have, and I would think that my position in front of God obligates me to be merciful to all).
  • On a related note, Strange mentions that universalism and attendant claims upon God's love would obligate God toward creation. Perhaps; but wouldn't the necessity of God's damning sinners do the same? But that's part of God's nature, the response would be. But what's the difference? Why is it so bad that God would act with love and graciousness toward all due to His nature, but good that God would be forced to condemn sinners (who are sinners due to His own choosing, on the compatibilist scheme) due to His nature? It seems that the former is more consistent with His self-revelation in Christ.
  • Strange mentions three types of God's love: (1) Intratrinitarian, (2) Universal, providential, and non-salvific, and (3) Particular, effective, and salvific. (1) and (3) are fine. (2), as rendered by Strange, is hardly a type of love at all. What sort of love would I have for my wife if I told her that I would do the chores at home, support her, and generally not give her that bad a life, even though I would divorce her in a year no matter what? Maybe we could improve this, so that I divorce her for unfaithfulness, which in turn stems from my having controlled her mind to become unfaithful in the first place (but according to her desires!); however, she would be safe if she would repeat back to me in a year a password which I may or may not tell her, and which is undiscoverable otherwise. True, the situation could be worse, but this is scarcely to be called love, and unworthy of being called the love of God for humanity as shown throughout Scripture and in Christ. When one roasts for all eternity, one less experienced cool Spring breeze is scarcely relevant.

I really wish that Evangelical (and Reformed, for that matter) Calvinists of this particular sort (there are better sorts, I realize) would pick up someone outside reading. I can't imagine that anyone without such a small theological bubble could even begin to state that all of this is the necessary result of soli Deo Gloria and God-centered theology.

1 comment:

S. Coulter said...

I really like your point that whether one sees God as obligated to damn sinners or obligated to redeem human beings made in His image, one is making God obligated to humanity.

Uber-nominalism's apparent desire to free God from any and all obligations to His creation, under any understanding of obligation seems silly to me. (Disclaimer: I have not read much, if anything, on the topic of nominalist theology).

If our concern is to make God's obligation be to Godself (God's nature) first and foremost, fine. But His nature will then be responsible for God's acting in other ways towards other beings. We could probably argue (from some sort of Kantian model) that every person's obligations to others stem from that person's obligation to herself.