Phenomenology of Spirit: Introduction

Learning languages is fun and all, but it's time for me to get back into something more than essays for philosophy. I've picked up Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, partially because I figure that I should get somewhat of a grasp on Hegel at some point, partially because I want to understand Kierkegaard better and so I want to know what's going on in German/Danish intellectual life at that time, and partially because the Introduction to Phenomenology of Spirit seems to have similar concerns about the nature of cognition that I have been wrestling with (I'm skipping the Preface to the book, as the Forward had suggested that it really is of much more use after one has read the rest of the book). As there's no way that I'll understand Hegel without doing some digesting of his work and restating it, I'm going to summarize what I've been reading. Anyone reading this blog who has a background in Hegel (which, as far as I know, is a grand total of 1 person), please feel free to let me know when I'm totally missing the point.

Key Points:

• We should have skepticism regarding our own views as well as others, and so find what is wrong with them as they come up.
• All negations are determinate negations, and not pure nothingness.
• While we cannot observe our consciousness directly, we can observe the patterns of consciousness as one leads to another through its negation.

Hegel's question is this: how do we know that we know what we know? It would seem that either there is a gap in between our concepts and the Absolute, or that we receive truth through a medium. Both would seem to create a problem for knowing. However, even this fear assumes something: that there is a difference between our cognition and the Absolute, or Truth. Now, we have not yet defined what these mean, and so must go about doing such.

Different sources give different answers to what any sort of knowledge is, and these different sources themselves end up merely being one word against another. We must instead look at the phenomenon itself, instead of these opinions about it (each of which is less than the phenomenon). We then start by doubting, but ourselves as well as authorities; our skepticism is against the "whole range of phenomenal counsciousness." We can look at the pattern of counsciousness which arises out of this systematic doubt, since every negation is not just a mere negation, but a definite negation of something specific.

It turns out that we have a goal given by the project itself: when knowledge no longer goes beyond itself, but is united with its goal, and "Notion corresponds to object and object to Notion." In the case of consciousness, the Notion is the same as its object, always going beyond itself. Because of this, it never can rest in a given place, always spoiling its own limited satisfactions.

Our study then is concerned with our knowing, and the essence/being-in-itself/truth. Consciousness is also always twofold, both distinguishing itself and relating itself to things. The relating is the knowing, and the distinguishing gives us the being-in-itself. What we want to know, then, is whether the Notion (of consciousness) is the same as the object (also consciousness). In comparing the knowledge with the truth, the truth is no longer simply being-in-itself, but rather has become being-for-consciousness of this in-itself; and upon the changing of our Notion, the object alters as well. So, the reality of what is happening is not directly observable by us.

However, in the course of experience, we will see constant negations in this stream of becoming. As negations are all negations of something, the second object in this sequence contains the "nothingness of the first," again a definite nothingness which preserves what was true about the first. The origination of these objects through these negations is what we can know, even if not the being-in-itself This process of negations also arises out of necessity, and so this process of becoming is itself a Science. Finally, we will come to a point (Hegel promises) while seeking out the patterns of consciousness where appearance and essence will coincide, giving us absolute knowledge.

I don't really understand what Hegel is saying well enough to offer any criticisms or thoughts on the matter; I think that I'll need to see a couple of his arguments in action. Nevertheless, if anyone has the time to read this, fire some questions my way to force me to try to work things out.