Saturday, November 29, 2008

The True or the Good?

Is it more important to seek what is good, or what is true? What is good can only be good is it really, truly is good, and so it seems that truth is preeminent. But don't we seek the truth because we feel that we ought to do so?

We can imagine situations in which the two can come apart, at least existentially (that is, within the way we live our finite lives on a daily basis) even if not in the end. I'm not simply talking about cases where we would have to kill innocents or sell our souls in order to come by some all-encompassing knowledge; it could be the pursuit of studies instead of helping at the soup-kitchen.

So, we have four cases, given that he two do seem interconnected somehow: (1) goodness is dependent on truth, (2) truth is dependent on goodness, (3) both or dependent on some third thing, and (4) the two are mutually dependent in some way.

If (1) is the case, then contemplation and study should consume most of our time; it is no use acting without knowing what is true first. This view has some plausibility in that virtues without wisdom can often be harmful. Courage, for example, even with the best intentions, can produce a monster if it is not guided by a knowledge of its proper use.

If (2) is the case, then we should primarily be acting in the world. It does seem that the person spending all of her time in study is missing the point, and is less of a human being than the one who is out there enacting justice (although this of course betrays my non-classical aesthetic sensibilities). If so, then it is plausible that the truth comes second to enacting good.

If (3) is the case, then we have a way of reconciling the two above options: neither the true nor the good completely trump each other, but rather are both connected to some third source. But, what is this third thing? "Being," whatever that may be? So, this option cannot help us without further elucidation. It's been done in various ways at various times, but that's another topic.

If (4) is the case, then we can avoid some mysterious common source and avoid subordinating one to the other. However, in what way is (4) true? Is there one abstract object one time referred to as the truth and at another time as goodness? But how does this make sense out of our existential conflicts? Another option is a division of labor: for some it is good to give preeminence to truth, and to others a preeminence to goodness. Society overall will be balanced, though individuals may not be (or, individuals themselves may overall be balanced through giving different priorities at different times).

6 comments:

S. Coulter said...

Once again, you make me think about William James... :)

One issue to raise here is the descriptive/normative distinction. What is true is not always good. It is true that many bad things have happened throughout history. It is true that racism is an ongoing, systemic problem in the U.S. The difference between the good and the true is one thing that motivates us to action--to bring the true in line with the good.

Another thing to bring up here is a distinction between valuable and not-so-valuable truths. As one epistemologist has put it, if we only cared about having a predominance of true over false beliefs in our noetic structure, we would spend our time memorizing the phone book.

A suggestion: as we try to bring the true (that is, the actual) in line with the good, it is important that we know certain truths, and not so important that we know certain other truths, because what we need to do in order to bring about good varies with what is true. Whether or not it is good to punish a person is in part dependent on whether or not it is true that the person committed the crime of which s/he is accused. Whether or not it is good to let considerations of race influence hiring decisions depends on what is true about the current state of society, and what is true about the consequences of adopting affirmative action policies.

I think this is pushing me towards some version of (4), but I'm not sure.

S. Coulter said...

In an attempt to be pithy:

What we need to know depends on what is good;
What we need to do depends on what is true.

M. Anderson said...

I really have to do some more study of James at some point, since you keep saying that....

I must admit that I had been thinking more along the lines of metaphysical/necessary truth. I think that your bringing in of historical truth is actually part of the solution: the historical situation is what partakes both of metaphysical truth and metaphysical goodness (or, metaphysical truth and goodness are both constructs coming from the historical situation, if you prefer). So this "situation" (state of affairs?) which both is a certain way and which should be in another way (while being capable of change) is what yields both truth and goodness, and so what unifies them. This unity comes about for us in a continual dialectic, though, so we can't posit a simple answer that'll solve all of our problems. I'll have to think about whether any of that makes sense.

Your "pithy" quote I think sums up the problem quite nicely.

So, you have to turn in the 2nd chapter of your thesis soon? I'd be interested in reading what you have done of your thesis over break (if you're willing), to see what you've been up to philosophically.

Nathan M. Blackerby said...

The true is subordinate to the Good and proceeds from it.

S. Coulter said...

By way of disclaimer, I can't claim to have studied James all that much. I said that this time because in the essay "The Will to Believe" (which I assume you've read by now at least once) James espouses a pluralism of ends in epistemology (namely: "seek truth!" and "avoid error!"). A lot of literature on James' ethics of belief (what I've seen of it, through the lens in which I see it) revolves around defending or refuting the thesis that James subordinated alethic/evidentiary to pragmatic/ethical concerns in belief-formation.

M. Anderson said...

Scott: I think that "Will to Believe" was in my thinking at some point in my thinking about the post; he's certainly a figure (in that essay, at least; it and a couple others are the only things I've read by him) with whom I wrestle, one moment liking what he says, and the next rejecting it.

Nathan: While I'm certainly sympathetic toward Neo-Platonism, how do you see that playing out in concrete events in life? Is the life of the philosopher more about living virtuously then about the pursuit of rational truth? Or does one pursue rational truth in the hope that it'll all work out in the end?