Some Interesting Propositions

I was talking with a fellow Marquette student the other day, and came to the conclusion that we should have a philosophy based on the following principle: that which is interesting, is true.

Now, it would seem from here that things should be true insofar as they are interesting. So what is most boring does not exist, while there are things which are more and more interesting and so more and more true (existent?). Following this, we come to the That Than Which None More Interesting Can Be Thought (TTWNMICBT).

Now, certainly it would be more interesting for such to exist in reality, and so therefore it must actually exist, or it is not the TTWNMICBT. But now, there is a catch. This would suppose that we are thinking of this thing, but surely something would be more interesting if we could not think of it. So the TTWNMICBT cannot be TTWNMICBT; it is only interesting through this That Which Is Too Interesting Too Be Thought (TWITITBT).

So we have the TWITITBT, of which we can't even properly speak, but which we need to explain everything else. Then we have the TTWNMICBT, which is only interesting indirectly. But if the TTWNMICBT wouldn't continually reach out to be more interesting, then it would not be the TTWNMICBT, as there is something more interesting than it. So, now we have the TTWNMICBT considered in itself, and the TTWNMICBT considered in its striving. But since the TTWNMICBT is the TTWNMICBT, any striving must also be toward was is not itself, and so the TTWNMICBT as striving gives us a multiplicity of interesting things.

Ok, someone's been reading too much NeoPlatonism. Back to work....