I must admit, religious pluralism is tempting me an awful lot; I have no reason left for believing the Christian story, other than that I don't have an alternative yet (or rather, perhaps that elements of my upbringing still cling); and despite Pascal's advice to participate in church and soon you'll start believing, I find myself sickened by the intellectual (and concomitant moral) laziness I see every Sunday, unless I interpret it through a mythological lens. But I don't have any arguments for pluralism, merely reasons why it is not as contradictory as I hear people say. So, here's at least the anti-criticisms:
Sometimes I hear that claim that pluralism says that everyone is right by saying that everyone is wrong. But the non-pluralist is saying that the vast majority of people in the world are simply dead wrong, and that even members of her own religion are usually only right in a practical sense (almost everyone in the pew is a modalist, tritheist, and docetist, I bet). So the pluralist really seems to be no worse off then anyone else; every view says that only a few people are really right, and at least the pluralist works out how most everyone else has some part of the truth. What is denied is that truth is merely binary, that everyone who does not have the truest expression of reality is thereby completely wrong; people can approach truth, and pluralism allows more people to do so.
Another problem that I here is that "Religions obviously conflict, so they can't all be true." To be perfectly blunt, this is a poor, lazy excuse for a criticism, and reveals immediately a lack of willingness to engage with the subject. The pluralist denies that the straightforward, literal truth of the different religions is what matters; there aren't any terribly strong arguments for any given metaphysical or historical truth, except those agreed by everyone (i.e. everyone can agree about basic facts of Muhammad's life, whether or not they are Muslims), and so for most people, the actual effect of such propositions are either (a) in virtue of their reality, or (b) in virtue of how they shape worldviews. If the latter, this is perfectly compatible with a mythological approach. If the former, someone had better do some significant empirical study to show this; without some empirical evidence, we are still left with (b) for most people, and myth again is how most people operate irregardless of metaphysical and historical concerns.
Another criticism one could hold is that pluralism negates God's grace. First, though, this seems to come from a grace/works dichotomy that in its eschewal of works as any practical dimension reflects the Reformation more than the New Testament; recent scholarship has shown that the Jews against whom Paul was arguing did not have the notion of works-based salvation which has been imputed to them, and so Paul's own conception of faith and works needs to be revised. Second, what sort of cheap grace is it which demands that God has grace so that less people can be saved? But then, why can't God have grace on people outside of his chosen religion but yet less than everyone, for one reason or another?
14 comments:
Re: Anti-Criticism #1 --
I think you're definitely on to something here. Exclusivism (as I understand the term in this context) can also mean that everyone is wrong; it is essentially a theory of truth and a theory of meaning; I take exclusivism to be compatible with fallibilism (this is probably my own view). Whether or not I'm a tritheist, I could end up being wrong about the nature of God. Exclusivism gives a certain meaning to making claims identifying theological error.
I can be open to a pluralism (of sorts) that allows us to say that unitarian Sunni Muslims are closer to the truth about the nature of God than a hypothetical ancient Greek who believes Homeric epics are literal truths, or an ancient Chaldean who worships Marduk, while saying further that Aquinas was even closer to the truth than orthodox Muslims (but Aquinas could have been in error to some degree, nonetheless). The attraction here (for me) is that pluralism (potentially) allows us to say more than does exclusivism. What I would want to resist, most fundamentally, is giving up on a notion of truth which grounds our making these claims about different theologies having different grades of truth. (I hate the term "absolute truth", but maybe that's what I'm clinging to here).
Am I giving the impression that I understand what you mean by "pluralism", or that I'm importing a different concept?
Re: Anti-Criticism #2 --
My own problem with the "lazy excuse for a criticism" you identify here is that it seems to regard religions as truth-bearers. I resist that usage of the truth predicate; strictly speaking, propositions are true or false. Religions are at least complexes of propositions--and so might be partly true or partly false, even in a binary or "exclusivist" sense of truth. Moreover, religions are much more than complexes of propositions, because even if theologies can be reduced to doctrines and doctrines to propositions, religions cannot be reduced to theologies. A religion is a cultural complex. (Hence, I maintain that "Christianity" denotes many religions, even apart from considerations of historic theological/doctrinal divides such as those birthed out of Christological controversies).
However, I probably differ with the pluralist regarding the importance of "the straightforward, literal truth" of specific theological and historical claims: such as that Christ rose from the dead, that in Christ God was reconciling the world to Godself, or that Christ is Lord (i.e., Pantokrator). We can dispute over the claim that "there aren't any terribly strong arguments for any given metaphysical or historical truth, except those agreed [to] by everyone" later. (a) As you know from our past conversations, I do think that these very claims are significant in virtue of their reality (i.e., in virtue of their truth). That the euangelion is true seems to me to be of primary importance to us evangelists as we follow Jesus Christ & his instructions to his disciples. That the euangelion is believed is important, but of secondary importance (in my [present] opinion). (b) How the euangelion and kerygma are understood by people in the Church--by those who believe them and/or accept them as normative--will be important because, as you say, they shape worldviews. And worldview has practical import with respect to how a Christian lives her life (or at least it should). Yet again, I would probably make belief secondary to reality here: that the poor, the widow, the orphan, and the stranger are treated justly is more important than the theological beliefs that inform a community's just treatment of these. But this does not mean that the truth of the kerygma does not matter, but only the actions of those who believe it: for the importance of justice for "the least of these" is grounded in theological realities: those realities we seek to capture with the language of the kerygma and euangelion.
So, I would replace this criticism ("Religions obviously conflict, so they can't all be true") with specific examples of significant conflict, for example: It matters whether Christ is both Prophet and the Divine Lord of All Things, or whether Christ and Muhammad are both Prophets. It matters whether in Christ (i.e., Jesus of Nazareth) God was & is reconciling the world to Godself, or whether Jesus simply taught and displayed in his life God's unconditional forgiveness of sins in contrast to a legalistic religious code that demanded sacrifice and punishment. Indeed, it matters whether God-in-Krishna taught that warriors should perform their social duty and kill their enemies in war, without concern for the consequences (a perhaps more literal reading of the initial part of the Bhagavad Gita, perhaps in harmony with the Code of Manu), or whether God desires that we regard all living things as our brothers, practice ahimsa (non-harm), and fight the great fight against our inner selfish desires (as perhaps the Mahatma Gandhi might have understood the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita). Whether one holds to a strict, binary notion of truth or a pluralistic notion of truth, what is important is: (a) that we can make sense of the idea that there are better and worse theological and moral claims, and (b) that we can distinguish between better and worse claims -- because what we need to do depends on what is true. If "pluralism" can accomplish this better than "exclusivism", good for pluralism. But then pluralism is not incompatible with the truth of the Christian story with its historic and theological claims, nor with the truth of the claim that Christ's way is better (truer) than the Buddha's or the Brahmin's or the shaman's or the imam's...or whatever. Nor is it incompatible with comparable claims favoring some form of Buddhism or Islam or whatever.
Re: Anti-Criticism #3 --
I'm not sure what is meant by the criticism you are attacking here.
However: Paul, interestingly enough (on the reading I follow), was arguing for inclusion and against exclusion when he argued against a theology of salvation by works of law (e.g., circumcision & observance of Kashrut).
I'm guessing that the criticism you have in mind says something like this: pluralism is works-righteousness salvation because it says anyone can work their way to heaven by living up to whatever standards are normative in their own tradition; the idea that "good Buddhists" and "good Hindus" and "good Muslims" and "good Jews" get into heaven for being "good" is theologically repugnant--so, of course, is the idea that "good Christians" get into heaven for being "good". Reformed theology still runs thick enough in my blood that I sympathize with this criticism. As you know, I have sympathy with Talbot's universal restorationist view (which certainly uses Reformed theological concepts of grace & salvation): bad Christians, good Christians, bad Hindus, good Hindus, bad Jews, and good Jews, along with everyone else may ultimately be saved by the grace of God--working in Christ to reconcile the world to Godself. God does not show favoritism. This kind of universalism is strongly opposed to Hick's brand of pluralism, though. It insists on the unique truth of certain unique and essential claims of Christian theology.
Another thing I imagine the criticism you have in mind here might say is this: there would be no point in the gospel, or the death of Christ, if anyone can be saved by any religion. Thus it profanes the gracious work of God in Christ to suggest that Christ is not necessary for salvation. Again, I will probably sympathize with some version of this criticism of pluralism (a pluralism like Hick's) while drawing a strong line between the claim, on the one hand, that Christ is necessary for salvation and the claim, on the other hand, that confessing Christ and belonging to a Christian church is necessary for salvation. I am not so committed to the latter (for me, the jury is still out) as I am to the former.
Re: "I have no reason left for believing the Christian story, other than that I don't have an alternative yet"
This is a different issue than the pluralism/exclusivism issue, of course. I imagine this has been and continues to be a painful process for you. I hope and pray yours will be a case where pain bears good fruit, rather than simply leaving open wounds.
I'm curious--what do you make of the claim that Christ rose from the dead, as a historical claim? Do you take a stance of agnosticism or skepticism toward this historical claim? Or is it rather a matter of your lacking reason to endorse a Christian theological interpretation of the historical event? Regarding the former, what makes the argument based on the birth of the early church (the conversion of the apostles after the crucifixion and their persistence despite persecution after Pentecost) insufficient in your judgment? Regarding the latter, what are one or two other specific alternative interpretations you find plausible? I'd be interested in picking your brain further here.
I have put Scot McKnight's Finding Faith, Losing Faith: Stories of Conversion and Apostasy on one of my Christmas wish lists. Maybe it would be interesting for both of us to read this and talk about it? If you're interested, I'll probably get a copy from the library if I don't get one for Christmas.
Thank you very much for the thoughtful reply, Scott. I think that you unpacked a great deal of what I had crammed into the post, as well as pointed out a few reasons why I myself could not endorse a Hicksian pluralism. So, I will not comment too much on the content of what you said for anti-criticisms #1 & #2, since I mostly either agree or don't see your criticisms as the ones with which I am concerned.
My main problem with "lazy excuses for criticisms" is the following, which probably should have specified in my post. Let's say we have person x who advocates view A, and who is arguing against view B. A genuine criticism by x would show how B fails on its own grounds. If x simply accepts the premises of her own view, then she has not shown B to be wrong; merely that A and B are different.
So, to say that conservative Evangelicalism is not Hicksian pluralism is, I take it, a pretty straightforward claim. But to criticize pluralism because it is not following orthodox Evangelicalism's view of truth/religious statements/etc. is irresponsible, and that's what I see in a lot of criticisms of it. Whatever I think of the particular brand of pluralism under consideration (which I was leaving deliberately vague), at least it needs to be dealt with fairly, and its own context needs to be understood.
Concerning the problem of grace and law: my problem is that the notions of "salvation by works" as we understand it seems to show up more in Reformation polemic than in anyone's actual views; not that there aren't some adherents, and even pretty explicit ones (the Muslim theologian 'Ashari comes to mind), but that it is not as widespread or serious a concern for people, which means that notions of grace which are built in opposition are also suspect.
But, in any case, views of grace which damn more people than supposedly non-gracious views just intuitively seem to have gone wrong somewhere; "grace" should not be a synonym for "arbitrariness." Despite your Reformed blood, I don't really see you falling into that camp.
Finally, concerning my problems with faith: I'd love to go through that book with you, provided that I can find a copy somewhere. As for my current beliefs on the historical event of Christ's resurrection, I must admit to being skeptical, but accepting it because I can't quite part with the belief yet (still too much fear of hellfire tucked into my bones, which has a lot to do with why I am so frustrated with the Christian community for not taking the intellectual side of faith as seriously as it ought to have done). I have additional skepticism concerning whether the event was interpreted correctly by the church, both immediately after and throughout history.
The birth of the early church is a unique event, but not unique enough for me. After all, the growth of a Middle Eastern empire under a monotheistic religion from a bunch of nomadic, polytheistic Arabic tribes is also somewhat odd, for example. And persecutions in other religions also have been known to cause growth and solidarity (sometimes, not always), as far as I can tell. So, I don't really have any alternative explanations for the growth of the church, just reasons for not seeing it as such a singular event.
I think I agree with you about the irresponsibility of criticizing another view from one's own commitments (commitments not held in common with the view being criticized), and then considering yourself to have defeated the view or to have shown it to be intrinsically irrational.
At the same time, there is a place for clarifying ideological incompatibilities between different paradigms / philosophies.
For me the issue is: Do I find Hick's position (for example) plausible or not? And, either way, what is it that I find pluasible or implausible about the view? This is an exercise in articulating my own view and figuring out what I think, and why. This is admitedly a subjective enterprise. It is not intended to convince Hick or anyone else--unless they resonate with the commitments / intuitions that underly my judgment.
Now, once I've figured out what I find plausible/implausible about a view, I can go about critically evaluating the intuitions / commitments that underly my judgment of plausibility/implausibility.
However, I take a fallibilist/pragmatist/quasi-Peircian approach here. I don't take a hyper-modernist/quasi-Cartesian approach, which says I am only justified in holding on to my commitments / intuitions if they can survive skeptical criticism. I admit that I could be wrong...but I tend to hang on to my own commitments until they stop "working" or until I wake up and find myself genuinely doubting them. (Peirce said not to induce doubt where it doesn't already exist; he was opposed to suppressing real doubt via authority or closed-mindedness, but he was also opposed to "philosophical" doubts that lead to skepticism).
--
Re: "salvation by works"
I am neither a sociologist, nor am I widely-read as a comparative religions student. But if I do some folk, armchair sociology, it seems to me that a lot of concerns about Hell arise from concern that God might send "good people" there. I think it is healthy and appropriate early on when we have these conversations in the church to clarify the role of works and grace in our soteriology. We may end up redefining our concerns in terms of our love and concern for concrete individuals (and by extension to people we don't know), rather than on the basis of works. In relatively recent Sunday School conversations with high schoolers, students have (rather explicitly)expressed much less of a problem with the notion of rapists and genocidal dictators going to Hell than with their non-Christian friends going to Hell. Of course, I think we need to radically change the conceptual framework in which these discussions take place. But I rarely accomplish that in twenty minutes with any success. :)
I think that I agree with your approach, at least in relation to how we practically have to go about the philosophical life.
I have no problem with simply clarifying positions and paradigms; not every Christian account of pluralism needs to legitimately criticize it.
This clarification can take place in two ways, it seems to me. One is the more subjective route that you seem to be taking: I'm trying to understand my own views better and I am using some other view (as I see it) to accomplish that end. And this is fine.
There is also a sort of public clarification, which seems to me to require much more care in learning the other view. When I claim to be representing Advaita Vedanta in an apologetic work which is more concerned with delineating the Christian message than arguing for it, for example, I still need to understand Advaita on its own terms as best as I can, with written confessions to the extent that I cannot.
Concerning Peirce, I'm trying to decide what I think about his view that you presented. There is some intuitive plausibility to it, it seems to me. However, I do see groups which I think could benefit from a healthy dose of doubt, at least enough to realize that their answers aren't so complete and their positions so steadfast as they'd like to believe.
Concerning your example of Hig School views of Hell, it seems that there are (at least) two different sentiments mixed up with the worry that non-Christian "good people" will go to Hell. First is the salvation by works problem: why hasn't this person earned Heaven? That, of course, is poor theology (although I wonder how much of that sort of thinking is only possible because we've set up the works/grace distinction).
The second problem is that if a worse person goes to Heaven and a better one does not, there is an issue of justice; the good person is damned precisely because of her good deeds, it would seem, and not because she is a sinner who did not measure up. This seems to me to be a more serious issue; it would seem that all too many people are not Christians precisely insofar as they are concerned with matters of truth and goodness, not simply because they are sinners (although they are that too). This view, I would hold, is not (primarily?) about works-salvation because it is not concerned if everyone gets the same, so long as people aren't punished for doing good.
Hi Michael,
For those of us unfamiliar with any sort of robust categorization of the different sorts of pluralism out there, could you possibly provide a brief delineation of different views on the topic? I'm imagining that there's at least a basic dichotomy between views that reject the notion of "truth" altogether (or at least of truths being ordered in some fashion, absolute or otherwise) on the one hand, and on the other hand, those that are willing to accept the notion of some sort of truth, but consider it inaccessible, or ineffable, or whatever (and I would include here those views that would say each religion contributes a different perspective to human understanding of what we can call the Real [I think that's Netland's term, or even Hick's?], such as the popular "blind men and elephant" analogy, because in that view, the Real is at least functionally ineffable).
Also, by the final paragraph of your original post, would I be correct in assuming you were alluding to the "New Perspectives" on Paul? One of the most fascinating little words in the Bible is the first "For" (Gk.: gar) of Eph. 2:10, in the context of coming just after 2:8-9. Now I don't like proof-texting, so let's understand v. 10 as being here a metonymy for a great many teachings of Jesus, James, the writer of Hebrews, and of course, Paul himself, among many places in the New Testament that emphasize works. I certainly hold that, apart from the genuine death-bed conversion, those who intellectually ascent to the truth-claims of the Gospel, yet see none of its fruit (e.g., Gal. 5:22-23) in their lives, ought to tremble the second-most of anyone, behind only those who add teaching to this equation. Nonetheless, I would still posit that pluralism negates, in some sense, God's grace, because I believe the moral calculus of an action's rightness or wrongness depends in large measure on motivation, and I believe the only acceptible motivation for a moral action is to please/honor/whatever God through Christ (Heb. 11:6) (I know this is controversial even among Christians, but I do think it's the Biblical report, and besides, I just can't imagine what other motivation would be acceptible to God, but I'd like your thoughts).
Just out of curiosity, have you read Netland on this at all? I know he interacts with Hick, and that's not necessarily the pluralism you're most interested in (although if you don't mind sharing, I'd be curious to know what is), but still, I think, his views might be informative.
Finally, a parting thought on your first paragraph of your original post: you should be sickened by the intellectual and concomitant moral laziness you see every Sunday. I think God is. He might even turn over a table selling [insert your favorite self-help-in-nominally-theological-garb title here] outside the sanctuary after services. But your response doesn't have to be to conclude that it can't be true. I'm sure William Wilberforce and MLK were sickened by the intellectual and moral laziness of the church of their times, too. John XXIII was. Erasmus was. Paul was, when Peter had ditched the Gospel for tradition. And Jesus seems to have been, too. Their response was to sharpen iron. It took guts. They often took a lot of grief and got little to show for it during their lifetimes. But I think it's safe to say that all of these men did the Church a great service, as have probably countless other less-famous ones throughout history. I've needed sharpening, and you've done that graciously and effectively for me many times over, and I pray you continue doing that for me. And I pray that you do that for others, as well. Never lose your intellectual rigor. But never lose your faith, either. We need you too much for either outcome.
Kevin: Michael may want to give his own answer to the question about varieties of religious pluralism, but on the other hand this might save him some work: http://www.religioustolerance.org/rel_plur1.htm. (See especially the various points under "Meaning #3".)
The role of motivation in ethics is a complex topic. But regardless of the position one takes on that issue, I would say that desire to please God would not be the only morally worthy motivation for action, because I would say atheists & non-theists can engage in ethically right action and, indeed, be morally virtuous persons. One might be able to muster a good theological argument that desire to please God is a "higher" motivation in some way, though.
Biblically speaking, as Christ teaches us there are two equally great (and closely tied-together) commandments: (1) love God, and (2) love your neighbor, the latter should also serve as a morally worthy motivation for action. 1 John 4:8 aside, there are many loving atheists. :)
Michael: Peirce would agree with you that many people need to do some more doubting. On my reading of him, the issue is how we respond to our actual doubts. Some people are trained, or have trained themselves, to immediately suppress these doubts--that's what's bad. How to distinguish between natural doubt and philosophical doubt is an issue; so is how to distinguish between artificial philosophical doubt and deliberate philosophical doubt self-induced in an attempt to overcome one's trained disposition to suppress what should be natural doubts.
On the topic of the New Perspective vs Reformed readings of Paul on justification, Halden has just mentioned a book that attempts a third way. Link
Woo hoo, discussion!
A quick introduction, since you guys both post here: Kevin was a dormmate at Trinity and is now on staff at a new church. S. Coulter was a fellow student at Taylor, in philosophy and biblical studies, who is now off pursuing graduate work. I'll let you guys fill in more details if you want.
Kevin: I have not read Netland, and I probably should. He is one of the conservative voices which I would trust on the matter, being one of Hick's best students and all (as well as from my own experience in talking with him).
I was referring to some extent to the New Perspective, but to what I had taken to be most settled issue there (namely, that the Jews did not hold to the stereotypical salvation-by-works scheme). I'm not well read-enough to really hold up my historical claim (it was more of a rant than a well-thought-out argument), though I wish it were dealt with more often.
Concerning the motivation for good deeds: It would seem that something other than doing something for God through Christ is necessary, unless "through Christ" can be understood in a somewhat general way. After all, Enoch and Elijah did not know Christ as a human being who had come to earth and died for their sins. Other than that, I would agree with Scott's bringing in of 1 John and the Second Commandment (though I would say that loving atheists do know God, since God is knowable beyond what we label God to be).
And concerning the definition of pluralism, the site to which Scott pointed has a good overview (thanks, Scott!), and I would be talking about #3. I'm leaving "pluralism" vague, but opposed to exclusivist views. I would also take there to be some truth to be had, even if ineffable (like Hick's Real, as you pointed out). Also, I would like to include some sort of salvific/practical element (it doesn't matter much if Muslims are closer to the truth than Pagans, if this doesn't entail a greater degree of a God-filled life). I don't like letting my metatheories dictate too much of the specifics, though, so we'll leave behind questions of whether all religions would be good, or all axial-age religions, or even just Christianity with everything else partaking in its truth.
Scott: I think that you're starting to drag me into the Pragmatists again. I'll have to go and read Peirce now as well... what's a good starting point for him, for those off-seconds I have during the semester?
Hi, Kevin, nice to meet ya'. FYI: I spent most of my time as an undergrad in Biblical Literature in the NT, and most of that in Paul. My graduate school experience is limited, and restricted to my Philosophy half. I'm not a Ph.D. candidate and cannot claim to be a specialist in anything.
Michael: the standard works by C.S. Peirce every philosophy student theoretically reads are the essays "Fixation of Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear". One thing Peirce does in "Fixation of Belief" is outline four "methods" of fixing belief: (1) the method of tenacity, (2) the method of authority, and (3) the a priori method, and (4) the method of scientific inquiry. The first basically is the deliberate avoidance of all stimuli that could encourage doubt. The second method is a more social version of the first: one depends on a community of authority (you're supposed to think of the Roman Catholic Church here) to suppress doubt for you. The third method Peirce associates with speculative metaphysics. (His criticisms of this field are deliberately Kantian). The fourth method is the one Peirce defends as best.
Read it yourself: http://www.peirce.org/writings/p107.html
Peace to you.
I looked on my reading list for comps, and sure enough, those two works were on there. I just haven't worked my way up to the 19th century yet (with the exception of RA work for a Nietzsche scholar)....
I think that Peirce makes most of the points which I would want to, especially in the last paragraph of "The Fixation of Belief." My main concern (probably often-articulated) would be the individualism which seems to underlie it: "do what pleases you and I'll do what pleases me." Of course, it is an antidote to totalitarian regimes which suppose that they know best, but it seems to overlook the political nature of human beings (the "social impulse" as Peirce puts it). It seems that, if I have some inkling of what is truly good, I should try to share it with others, perhaps in a Socratic fashion; but then I have less grounding for letting others stay in their position of "tenacity."
On the other hand, tenacious people do get things done (and so are impossible to not be envied, as Peirce says), and this seems to be a necessary component of society. So, do we let people pursue something which ultimately is against their best interests, for the good of the whole? Or is it really in their best interests, even though it requires them to be blatantly blind to the nature of reality? Do we as human beings have multiple ends which must practically contradict each other?
What happens if, on the other hand, I try to give them some conception of the good, and they turn out as an Alcibiades?
Nice to meet you, too, Scott, and thanks for your helpful and interesting posts. I'm a recent M.Div. graduate with only a hobbyist's interest in philosophy, with my formal training limited to just two non-logic courses in undergrad. So take anything I say with a grain of salt, or a shaker-full.
I just looked up the Peirce article, and focused attention mainly on the final paragraph (per Michael's endorsement) for the sake of time, but I found a very worthy jem in the point that "to avoid looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it may turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous," and of course we see this fear constantly in theology - in fact, I had someone reject a particular doctrine on the grounds that it was, to use her word, "scary."
Nonetheless, I'd like to add a couple of caveats to Peirce: The first is seen in the light of history, namely, that at the time of Peirce's writing, I'd imagine it would have been almost unthinkable that classical mechanics weren't quite an accurate picture of the universe (and in some cases, woefully inaccurate), but such was the case. So this doesn't dispel scientific investigation as an epistemic tool - rather, it encourages us to do all the more scientific investigation - but does call into question the epistemic weight we ought to ascribe to the conclusions of science.
I'll just throw in the over-used (but still relevant here) point that science is not equipped to adjudicate all questions (e.g., those concerning non-observable/repeatable events), so if God does in fact have a certain property, for example, or acts a certain way, if we wish our opinions to coincide with fact, science may be no help at all on the matter.
Moreover, this business of different epistemologies helping one "to coincide with fact" or not seems to be a little circular in its suggestion that scientific investigation is the method to be preferred, owing to its coincidence with fact. Of course if we assume it best coincides with fact, we'll prefer it! But that's begging the question, isn't it? Or am I missing something?
I do see the points both of you put forward on my position of the motivation for ethical action. Let me refine my thoughts a bit: Michael, you make an excellent point by bringing in the Old Testament God-followers; certainly my tidy, post-Resurrection, Reformed categories don't fit all situations. On the other hand, and I'm close to just thinking "out loud" here, but let me posit a definition of morally worthy action, a reason why the actions of nonbelievers don't fit the bill, and please let me know what you think:
I'd suggest a truly morally worthy action (and I'd recognize some degrees here, so I mean one that's 100% purely morally worthy) is the sort for which, if all my actions were of this nature, Christ would not have had to die for me. In turn, I would suggest that even an action that's highly good in relative moral terms (say, Gandhi's peaceful protests) still does not live up to this standard, because it is in some sense an act of worship, either of an abstract concept (peace, human rights, whatever), or of humanity unto itself, or something else, or some mixture of the above, but not of Yahweh. And worshiping anything besides Yahweh is sin right? (And even if we hold that you can worship Him if you've never heard of Him, it seems pretty unlikely that any action of a non-Judeo-Christian would qualify as pure, unbridled Yahweh worship, if indeed such actions are done by anyone at all.) I realize this is probably totally hypothetical, since it's doubtful that any (non-Jesus) human has ever done such an action, including many Christians, but then we're right back to where we were, which is how pluralism doesn't allow for the fullness of God's grace. Anyway, I'd love your thoughts.
Hey, Kevin,
I have two comments on your last paragraph.
(1)
You suggest that: "a truly morally worthy action...is the sort for which, if all my actions were of this nature, Christ would not have had to die for me."
Does this notion really fit well with Reformed theology? If meant to be taken seriously, it seems to suggest that in principle a human being all of whose actions were morally perfect would not need reconciliation with God. In other words, it implies that an individual's moral failure is just what God-in-Christ delivers us from. My understanding is rather that Reformed theology thinks that our problem is that we have fallen Adam as our head (federalism), at least until we are incorporated into the Body of Christ. Certainly personal moral failings flow from one's being "in Adam", and likewise personal moral progress proceeds from one's being "in Christ". But the way you stated things seems to get this backwards.
To summarize, I read you as endorsing A, whereas I prefer B:
A. moral failure --> need of atonement
vs.
B. corporately "in Adam" --> need of atonement (with moral failure as a side effect)
(Recognizing that there is probably lots of legitimate diversity within the umbrella of Reformed theology, my real question is: is A what you really meant to endorse?)
Granted, Jesus is a human being who is morally perfect and who does not need atonement. But again, I understand this in terms of his not being "in Adam": his moral perfection as well as the wholeness of his relationship to the Father flow from his corporate identity, even though he is unique among all human beings (except perhaps Adam & Eve prior to the Fall).
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You suggest that all (imperfectly) morally good actions, especially those done by human beings outside of the Body of Christ, are morally imperfect just because they are idolatrous, i.e. they are done out of worship of some abstraction or person other than God which is given moral value.
I see some plausibility in this idea. However, I think if I endorse it I have to see nearly all (if not in fact all) human beings' actions as morally imperfect and idolatrous in this way--not excluding members of the Body of Christ. Good Abrahamic monotheists do not make images of God and bow down to worship them. But, I defeasibly contend, we all relate to God in terms of our imperfect conceptions of God--this is especially true, I think, when we relate to God as the Good and try to live righteously. Why is Gandhi's conception of God inherently flawed and mine is not, such that he is guilty of idolatry and I am not? Surely that I confess the identity of Jesus of Nazareth with the One, Personal, Lord of All Creation does not make that much of a moral difference between us? (I suppose this is the point of contention between us.)
To take another tack in response to the same point, let me go back to the two great commandments according to Jesus. I will admit that sometimes some people do good actions motivated by allegiance to an abstract concept which is in some sense or another their god. But I will also insist that sometimes some people do good actions motivated by love for concrete human beings. Teresa of Calcutta actively loved the poor because she saw Christ in them. Analogous non-Christian do-gooders might see intrinsic human worth, the same humanity they see in themselves, or the face of God in some different or less clear way. Unless we ascribe to Teresa and other Christians a mystic vision that enables them to see Christ in the poor more clearly than non-Christians can, I'm not sure there a substantive difference can be maintained. But, perhaps, we do want to ascribe this vision as a power of the indwelling Spirit?
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OK. Briefly, in response to your comments on Peirce: Peirce was no advocate of "scientism", if that is understood as the doctrine that the natural sciences have already given us a perfect and inerrant conception of the world. He was a fallibilist: it is essential to his pragmatism/pragmaticism that all the conclusions of scientific inquiry should be held defeasibly. Peirce sometimes talks about an eschaton of scientific inquiry towards which the community of scientists continually progress. Only the conclusions of this ideal, eschatological scientific community could be considered to determine (or even to define, on a prominent reading of Peirce) truth.
I like to balance Peirce and James against one another in my own epistemic practice. When I shy away from a theological claim because it is "scary", I'm following in the footsteps of James, I think. :)
But in any case, I'm not committing myself to either of their epistemologies whole-hog. (I'm a fallibist about my epistemological beliefs, too: including fallibilism!)
SC said, "I think if I endorse it [Kevin's suggestion on morality & idolatry] I have to see nearly all (if not in fact all) human beings' actions as morally imperfect and idolatrous in this way--not excluding members of the Body of Christ."
That is, in fact, the position of several professors I've studied under (at Covenant Theological Seminary in St. Louis): Christian and non-Christian, we are all constantly turning to other gods besides Yahweh. I heard Dan Allender give a talk last spring, and he held that position and suggested that we use "holiness" as a separate category from "morality," and further, "morality" doesn't have anything to do with "holiness." I don't know that I understood him very well, but I think he was saying that holiness has to do with God's delight in us (and, I guess, our response to and enjoyment of Him), and morality has to do with social conventions (I guess that would have to do with questions of how to live for the benefit of society). So yes, I'm a believer in Christ and an idolator. In believing that, I take comfort from my beliefs that God knows I want to "relate to God as the Good and try to live righteously" -- or, as I'd put it, I wish I was more faithful even though I'm not -- and that God's grace is big enough that He forgives me for my daily acts of idolatry.
Concerning the discussion about the relation of moral failure and the need for atonement: that sounds an awfully lot like my class notes about intra-Reformed debates about original sin and imputation of it. However, neither proposition is in my notes in the form SC put it, so you're probably not having the same discussion that was in my notes -- and honestly, systematic theology isn't my strong point, so I'm not sure I could explain related concepts very well. (If someone else is curious, you could try looking up, along with "federal headship," "mediate imputation" or "Amyraldianism" -- a 17th c. term for a similar-sounding debate -- but you might just figure out it's not the same thing that we're talking about.)
Now that I've connected to the conversation, I'm overdue an introduction to Kevin: I'm one of SC's sisters, and I'm a recent MDiv grad and an amateur philosopher too. I don't have much time to post, but I have a little more time to read, so I try to follow along on Michael's blog sometimes. I guess, for me, the most fascinatingly disturbing question raised in this post is Michael's about what interpretations of grace are really more gracious (e.g., "'grace' should not be a synonym for 'arbitrariness.'") I haven't thought of any response to that issue yet.
First off, pleasure to meet you Reepicheep, and thanks for your input!
And apologies to all for my prolonged absence. Having said that, back to it, eh?
SC, in terms of the morality of Christians and non-Christians, you anticipated well my position concerning the effect of the Holy Spirit in the process. I'm not sure I'd want to see it in terms of a mystic vision so much as an ontological change: as believers, we retain a sin nature, and are in this sense in Adam (possibly; if not, the position is just as strong or more so), but we're also in Christ, and He in us! So it's not that I myself really perform actions that are morally better at all than those of the non-Christian, but Christ in me does. Or another way, my conception of Christ may be no better than Gandhi's - but the Holy Spirit's certainly is. And for that reason, I'm on board with Reepicheep's statement that "I'm a believer in Christ and an idolator." It's interesting, too, that this is an intra-Reformed debate even at the academic level; I'm not surprised, but hadn't been aware of that. I'm a total hack who's far more interested in theology and philosophy than learned about either (esp. philosophy).
Now, on the question of what exactly Jesus was atoning for: I'd take it that us being in Adam and us sinning are actually inseparable categories. In principle we can talk about hypotheticals wherein someone is in Adam but doesn't sin, or sins without being in Adam, but in practice, we have no excuse for any particular sin, and yet our being in Adam ensures that we will sin. On the other hand, if a person sins, is this not proof that the person is in Adam (or carries the effects of being in Adam into the state of being in Christ)? Even at the hypothetical level, though, take someone who's not (and has never been) in Adam, but does sin. Wouldn't such a person require atonement?
Finally, on the epistemic side, I applaud Peirce and you for your fallibilism, since that reflects a certain intellectual humility that isn't always present. Still, I have the concern that science may miss out on entire categories of events that are true, but non-observable, non-repeatable, etc. I guess I would ask this question of all (and I mean this in an open-ended, not rhetorical, manner): is there a place for faith in epistemology?
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