Semantics

As philosophers, we often get into quarrels over the meaning of words. Alternatively, we dismiss issues as being simply matters of "semantics". To what extant is either justified? I will argue that there is some worth in semantic disputes for both theoretical and practical reasons, although they ought to be curtailed in theoretical disputes.

Theoretically, different uses of different words can open up new aspects of reality. Take the term "truth" for example. Now, some want to hold that only propositions can be true; this seems to be a standard analytical approach. Others want to use it for other matters as well; Avicenna uses the term (or at least an Arabic equivalent in "h.aqq") to first designate that which exists absolutely, second for what exists permanently, and third for propositions and beliefs when the correspond to external reality. Other uses abound.

So, which one of these definitions should we accept? But I take this question to be wrong-headed. Which of these definitions does not get at some aspect of reality? If the term works as a tool to help us to understand reality, why not use it as such? Now I can use the term "truth" to explore propositions, now I can use to explore Avicenna's more complex notion, and in both cases there is something of philosophical value.

Then, is there any room for quibbling over the meanings of words? For theoretical matters, there is some, but not as much as one often sees. To differentiate one's use of "truth" from others is beneficial because it helps to sharpen one's one use of the term. Also, these uses of the term are not accidentally related; there is no pure equivocation in the uses of "truth", but they are analogical and they do exist in tension with each other. This will lead into a practical issue in a moment.

What does not seem to be warranted is the triumph of one use over all others. One should argue for one's own use and should clarify it; this is all well and good, and may need to foil to be effective. However, one never has the resources to say that all other uses are wrong, ill-advised, and so on, on a completely theoretical level. In addition, not even our technical terms are completely unambiguous; try to find a single definition of "substance" in Aristotle or in Western thought in general. Let's not pretend that our discourse or our subject matter is clearer than it is.

Now on to practical matters. As I said before, the meanings of a term are in tension with each other. There is enough similarity in uses of the term "truth" that we want to wrestle over the term. Different uses call to mind different narratives, different perspectives, different connotations. There are sometimes reasons for suggesting that we put forward one set of connotations rather than another. This seems to come up especially in political contexts of various sorts; the language we use shapes our views of others. Theoretically, I can accept that "he" is (or was) just the standard pronoun used in gender-ambiguous cases. However, that doesn't completely explain the situation. Given contemporary attention, the exclusive use of "he" sends other messages, while the use of "she" sends different ones.

We are actually trying to communicate here, and communication involves other people who will understand things in certain manners. We have material conditions under which we work, even as analyzers of thought, and we must pay attention to these as well. So, for purposes of communication and for actually trying to create a perspective, attaching meaning to words does matter.