Skepticism

I have heard some people, theologians in particular, criticize Enlightenment standards of knowledge. The argument goes like this: "Descartes et al. told us to doubt everything. But why should we not doubt this injunction in the first place?" Therefore, it seems, we should not have to doubt anything and can sit nice and safe in our communities. I think that this argument is rather sophistic, but it is widespread enough to be worth responding to.

Why do I go so far as to say that it is sophistic? Because, at least on one level, I do not think that it really interacts with what it means to doubt. If I can doubt a fact, that fact is therefore doubtable. Possibility of doubt already entails doubt; it is not an additional step. Certainty requires certainty, and nothing short of it. So, if there is any way in which doubt can enter, it has entered.

But at this point, one will say, "But we don't need certainty; we get by on probabilities most of the time." But, as I have said in an earlier post, we have no idea about what is probable except in a mathematical or pragmatic fashion. Mathematical probability entails certainty about those probabilities, and we are back to certainty. Pragmatic probability I think is closer to what is wanted.

But pragmatic probability doesn't lead to truth. It leads to efficiency. The fact that I can usually act as if sense data were accurate does not, in itself, mean that they are. It means that it may be the case that a deceit helps us to live better. Now, think that there are reasons for assuming that one can go from here to a certain reliability of the senses, but that requires that one argue for one's position and actually accept the skeptic's problem.

So, even on commonly accepted matters, we only have enough to go on to guarantee what works here and now. Hardly enough to establish anyone's metanarrative. In addition, people actually do disagree on quite important matters. Disagreeing testimony automatically brings the original testimony into question; possibility of doubt entails doubt. If one prefers, the amount and the quality of the disagreeing testimony is often high enough to be worth investigating, though it is always possible that the least source will overthrow everything you think you know. And you have absolutely no idea as to the probability of this happening

In summary, if one can doubt, this immediately leads to a rational doubt. If one is seeking for truth, this is always a problem. One can ignore the problem, and perhaps the problem of skepticism should be ignored. One just should not think that one has arrived at any truth by doing so.